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DETERMINING THE (IN)DETERMINABLE: RACE IN
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES
D. Wendy Greene*
In recent years, the Brazilian states of Rio de Janeiro, So Paulo, and Mato
Grasso du Sol have implemented race-conscious affirmative action programs in
higher education. These states established admissions quotas in public universities
for Afro-Brazilians or afrodescendentes. As a result, determining who is "Black
''
has become a complex yet important undertaking in Brazil. Scholars and the
general public alike have claimed that the determination of Blackness in Brazil is
different than in the United States; determining Blackness in the United States is
allegedly a simpler task than in Brazil. In Brazil it is widely acknowledged that
most Brazilians are descendants of Aficans in light of the pervasive miscegenation
that occurred during and after the Portuguese and Brazilian enslavement of
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1. Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw has explained that "Black" deserves capitalization
because "Blacks like Asians [and] Latinos ... constitute a specific cultural group and, as
such, require denotation as a proper noun." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Entrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1331, 1332 n. 2 (1988) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and
State:An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 516 (1982)). Additionally, Professor Neil Gotanda
contends that the capitalization of Black is appropriate since it "has deep political and
social meaning as a liberating term." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1991). 1 agree with both Professors Crenshaw and Gotanda
and for both reasons, throughout this Article when I reference people of African descent
individually and collectively the word, Black, will be represented as a proper noun.
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Africans. As a result, Brazilians ubiquitously profess their Afican ancestry. Yet, a
highly stratified racial classification system exists in Brazil whereby the guiding
principle for determining race is one's physical appearance--hair texture, skin color,
nose size, eye shape, for example. However, it is commonly assumed that the rule
of hypodescent-the presence of one African ancestor defines an individual as
Black-determines an individual's "Blackness" in the United States. Accordingly,
ancestry allegedly determines Blackness in the United States dissimilarly to Brazil,
where one's physical appearance is determinative.
Contrary to the proposition that race, and specifically Blackness, is fundamentally
different in Brazil and the United States, Professor Greene contends that one's
physical appearance is the primary determinant of Blackness in both American
nations. Indeed, one's ancestry is necessarily implicated in determining race based on
'physical appearance," as this method of classifying race is grounded in socially
mediated presumptions concerning how an individual's physical appearance denotes
his or her genetic makeup. Thus, in this Article, Professor Greene mitigates the
void in Brazil/U.S. comparative scholarship discussing race-conscious affirmative
action by delineating the universality of race, racial hierarchy, and racial ideology in
Brazil and the United States.
In doing so, Professor Greene first examines African slavery in Brazil and the
United States, which is crucial to the understanding of race, racial ideology, and
racial hierarchy in the two nations. Part I explores the differences and similarities
between the conception of race, specifically focusing on the construction of Black,
white, and multi-racial classifications. Part II also discusses the influence of slavery
and settlement patterns on the contrasting racial ideologies in both American
nations-"racial democracy" in Brazil and "racial purity" in the United States.
Additionally, in this section Professor Greene argues that a mutual racial hierarchy
and attendant racial physiognomy developed and endure despite the divergent racial
ideologies, settlement patterns and slavery law in Brazil and the United States.
In Part II Professor Greene provides a comprehensive analysis of historical and
contemporary racial determination cases decided by American courts and the various
methods these courts appropriated to determine an individual's race. Significantly,
Professor Greene's examination of racial determination cases debunks the widely
propagated notion that the rule of hypodescent is actually applied when determining
an individual's "Blackness". These racial determination cases also illuminate the
salience of physical appearance in determining race as well as the paradoxical nature
of race-specifically Blackness and whiteness-in the Americas; race is contextual,
subjective, and malleable yet simultaneously fixed, as physical constructs of
Blackness and whiteness have transcended geography, time, ideology, and
demography.
[VOL. 14:143
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This Article concludes in Part III with an evaluation of the determination of
Blackness in Brazil in informal and formal milieus; the viability of Brazilian
arbiters adopting U.S. judicial racial determination methods in the context of race-
conscious affirmative action in higher education; and the potential consequences of
doing so. According to Professor Greene, using entrenched constructs of Blackness
and whiteness when determining the proper beneficiary for affirmative action in
higher education will hopefully integrate Afro-Brazilians into educational and
professional realms they have been systematically and often automatically denied
entry and to which their lighter-skin counterparts have been provided access.
Moreover, Afro-Brazilians' participation in these spheres may induce the
dismantlement of an enduring racial hierarchy and concomitant system of racial
inequality--present in both Brazil and the United States-whereby Blacks
disproportionately occupy the most disenfranchised positions and whites the most
privileged, and socially mediated signifiers and meanings of Blackness and whiteness
respectively reinforce this status quo.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2009 Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th
President of the United States. Throughout President Obama's candidacy
and after his victory, one of the primary queries raised by the media re-
volved around his race: is America "ready" for a Black president?2 Even
2. See, e.g., John Meacham, The Editor's Desk, NEWSWEEK June 2, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/138504 (reporting findings of a Newsweek poll which
indicate twice as many Americans in a 2008 poll claimed that the United States is ready
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though it is publicly known that Obama's mother is a white American from
the Midwest and his father is a native of Kenya, the press as well as most
Americans would describe Senator Obama as the first Black president of
the United States, rather than the first mixed-race president. The general
depiction and acceptance of Senator Obama as Black rather than multi-
racial generates important questions related to America's common under-
standing of race. In the United States, is Obama deemed Black because he
has self-identified as Black? Is Obama defined as Black due to his known
African ancestry? Or is Obama generally regarded as Black in the United
States, despite his known white parentage, because of his physical appear-
ance-one which conforms to a socially constructed image of Blackness?
Since the era ofJim Crow, the rule of hypodescent-the presence of
one ancestor of African descent makes an individual's race Black-has
been articulated as the guiding principle for determining one's "Black-
ness" and "whiteness" in the United States. Accordingly, ancestry allegedly
determines Blackness in the United States dissimilarly to Brazil, where
one's physical appearance is determinative. In Brazil it is widely acknowl-
edged that most Brazilians are descendants of Africans in light of the
pervasive miscegenation that occurred during and after the Portuguese
and Brazilian enslavement of Africans.4 Therefore, one's physical appear-
ance-hair texture, skin color, nose size, eye shape, etc.-determines one's
race in Brazil. Contrary to scholarly opinion "[ujnlike in the United
States, race in Brazil refers mostly to skin color or physical appearance
rather than to ancestry"' and public adherence to this idea6 , one's physical
for a Black president than in a 2000 poll). Accord Ellis Cose, Ready But Are We Willing,
NEWSWEEK June 2, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/138512.
3. Interestingly, popular Brazilian singer, Caetana Veloso, remarked in an interview
with a S~o Paulo (Brazil) newspaper that "Obama looks like my father .... [h]e's a mulatto
that looks like someone from Santo Amaro (Veloso's hometown) .... I've heard [Barack
Obama has] said he looks like a Brazilian." Stephanie Beasley, Brazilians See Themselves in
Mixed-Race Obama, REUTERS June 10, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
politicsNews/idUSN1036510220080610. See also, Richard Rodriguez, See the Brown in
Us, NEWSWEEK June 2, 2008, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/138513 (opining
that Barack Obama is "brown" or "mixed").
4. E.g., Rebecca Reichmann, Introduction in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL 1, 4
(Rebecca Reichmann ed., 1999) (avowing "[m]ost Brazilians, regardless of appearance,
admonish visitors that all Brazilians share an African racial heritage").
5. EDWARD E. TELLES, RACE IN ANOTHER AMERICA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SKIN
COLOR IN BRAZIL 1 (2004). Accord Edith Piza & Filvia Rosemberg, Color in the Brazilian
Census, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL, supra note 4, at 37, 37; Antonio S~rgio Alfredo
Guimaries, The Misadventures of Nonracialism in Brazil, in BEYOND RACISM: RACE AND INE-
QUALITY IN BRAZIL, SOUTH AFiCA, AND THE UNITED STATES (hereinafter Beyond Racism)
157, 161 (CharlesV. Hamilton ed. et al., 2001) (explaining after "anthropological studies of
the 1950s and 1960s ... a consensus was reached in Brazil that it was physical appearance
and not origin that determined someone's color, as if there were some precise biological
way to define races, and as if all forms of appearances were not themselves conventions").
6. E.g., Beasley, supra note 3 (stating "[h]istorically, segregation and the one-drop of
blood rule left little room for racial ambiguity in the United States, where one is either
[VOL. 14:1,43
Determining the (In)Determinable
appearance is the primary determinant of Blackness in both American
countries. Indeed, an individual's ancestry is necessarily implicated in de-
termining race based on his or her physical appearance, as this method of
classifying race is grounded in socially mediated presumptions concerning
how an individual's physical appearance denotes his or her genetic
makeup.
Moreover, constructions of race and racial ideology in both coun-
tries share the same institutional roots: race-based slavery. Arguably
American concepts of race were developed in concert with the systematic
enslavement of millions of darker skinned peoples by Europeans with
lighter pigmentations. Accordingly, a racial hierarchy erected, whereby
individuals displaying physical markers associated with whiteness were
accorded the most privileged status and those whose phenotypes signified
Blackness were accorded the most degraded status.
In recent years, determining who is "Black" has become a complex
yet important undertaking in Brazil in light of the implementation of
race-conscious affirmative action programs in the states of Rio de Janeiro,
Slo Paulo, and Mato Grasso du Sol. Brazilian judicial and legislative bod-
ies have not prescribed formulaic criteria for classifying an individual's
race. Since rights and privileges have been granted and denied on the ba-
sis of race throughout U.S. history, however, U.S. courts have determined
an individual's race when the provision or denial of these rights and privi-
leges has been challenged on the basis of race. As a result, U.S. courts have
developed a rich body of racial determination law or judicial tests and
decisions determining race8 that may provide insight and guidance to
black or white."). See also Rodriguez, supra note 3 (asserting "for African Americans there
has often been no option [to self-identify as any other race than Black]: they've been de-
nied the possibility of mixture by the Jim Crow alchemy ... [because the] '[o]ne drop' of
African blood made you black no matter how light your skin or straight your hair or
complicated your lineage.").
7. My proposition that physical appearance-for example, skin color, hair color,
hair texture, lip and nose size-is the primary factor used to determine race in no way
discounts the import of other physical and/or "mutable" characteristics such as language,
clothing, accent, or hairstyles, which have also been used to define an individual's race
historically and contemporarily in both countries. See Antonio S~rgio Alfredo Guimaries,
The Misadventures of Nonracialismn in Brazil, in BEYOND RAcisM, supra note 5, at 157, 159
(acknowledging that "in addition to other physical features (hair texture, format of nose
and lips), [color or race in Brazil] also includes non-corporal markers such as dress, speech,
mannerisms, and so on."); See also D. Wendy Greene, "Title VII: What's Hair (and Other
Race-Based Characteristics) Got to Do With It?" 79 UCoLo. L. REv. 1355, 1369 (2008)
(arguing skin color, hair texture and facial characteristics are not the only signifiers of race
in the United States but other characteristics like social behavior, speech, and dress have
also been racialized throughout U.S. history).
8. Legislatures, governmental agencies, and courts have all played important roles in
the development of racial determination methods and thereby the socio-legal construction
of race. The contexts in which U.S. courts have determined race are analogous to the pre-
sent situation encountered by Brazilian arbiters. Therefore, this Article primarily examines
U.S. judicial modes of racial determination rather than detail the various racial
SPRING 20091
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Brazilian arbiters currently designating an individual's race for affirmative
action purposes. These cases illustrate that for U.S. judges and juries who
have been charged with determining Blackness, racial constructs based on
physical appearance, not the rule of hypodescent, have steered their legal
pronouncement of race.
This Article examines the alleged complexity of determining who is
Black or Afro-Brazilian 9 for affirmative action purposes in higher
education while surveying United States racial determination jurispru-
dence. This Article is not intended to serve as a dissertation on the legality
of race-conscious affirmative action or the efficacy of these programs in
the United States and Brazil. Since the United States is considered a
global forerunner in the implementation of race-conscious affirmative
action in higher education and employment, numerous scholars have de-
bated the validity, constitutionality, and utility of race-conscious
affirmative action in Brazil through a U.S./Brazil comparative lens.'0
However, there is a paucity of literature exploring fundamental issues in
facilitating race-conscious programs: specifically, who is the proper benefi-
ciary; how should this determination be made; and can Brazilian arbiters
adopt U.S. judicial modes of determining race to effectuate their race-
conscious affirmative action programs? The objective of this Article is to
mitigate this void in comparative scholarship by demonstrating the uni-
versality of race and the law's role in constructing race, racial ideology, and
racial hierarchy.
First, this Article discusses African slavery in Brazil and the United
States, which is crucial to the understanding of race, racial ideology, and
racial hierarchy in the two nations. Part I explores the differences and
similarities between the conception of race in Brazil and the United
States, specifically focusing on the construction of Black, white, and
multi-racial classifications. Part I also considers the influence of slavery
and settlement patterns on the contrasting racial ideologies in both
classification schemes developed by federal agencies and state legislatures. See Luther
Wright, Jr., Vhois Black, Vhos White and Who Cares? Reconceptualizing the United States'
Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VMNr. L. REV. 513 (1995), for a discussion on
racial determination modes for census purposes. See also Zaid A. Zaid, Note, Continually
Creating Races: The Census in the United States and Brazil, 20 NAT'L BlACK L.J. 42, 62
(2006-2007).
9. See Abdias do Nascimento and Elisa Larkin Nascimento, Dance of Deception: Race
Relations in Brazil, in BEYoN, D RACISM, supra note 5, at 105, 108.The Nascimentos explain
that the official color categories for African descendants, preto for individuals of a darker
complexion and pardo for mulatto and mestizo individuals, are commonly referred as negro,
afro-brasiliero, or afro-descendente. Id. The English terms, "Black," "African Brazilian," and
"people of African descent" represent the preto and pardo categories. Id.
10. See generally Ricardo Rochetti, Note, Not as Easy as Black and White: The Iniplica-
tions of the University of Rio de Janeiro's Quota-Based Adnissions Policy on Affirmative Action
Law in Brazil, 37 VAD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1423, 1460-64 (2004). See also Seth Racusen,
Making the "Impossible" Determination: Flexible Identity and Targeted Opportunity in Conteinpo-
rary Brazil, 36 CONN. L. REv. 787,793 (2004).
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American nations-"racial democracy" in Brazil and "racial purity" in the
United States. Additionally, this section illustrates that a mutual racial hier-
archy constructed around physical appearance developed and endures
despite the divergent racial ideologies, settlement patterns and slavery law
in Brazil and the United States.
Next, Part II examines a series of racial determination cases decided
by American courts historically and contemporarily and the various
methods these courts appropriated to determine an individual's race. This
survey of racial determination cases illuminates the salience of physical
appearance in determining race as well as the paradoxical nature of race-
specifically Blackness and whiteness-in the Americas; race is contextual,
subjective, and malleable yet simultaneously fixed, as physical constructs of
Blackness and whiteness have transcended geography, time, ideology, and
demography. Part III concludes with a consideration of Brazilian arbiters
adopting American judicial modes of determining race and the potential
consequences of doing so.
I. SLAVERY, RACE, AND RACIAL IDEOLOGY IN BRAZIL AND THE
UNITED STATES SETTLEMENT, SLAVERY, AND DEMOGRAPHY
The variance in settlement patterns and the importation of Africans
greatly affected racial constructs in Brazil and the United States. Both fac-
tors brought about a distinctive demography within the American nations
and consequently racial classifications representative of each country's
populace. Currently, Brazil possesses the second largest population of Afri-
can descendants in the world; only Nigeria has more." The massive
importation of African slaves to Brazil for nearly four centuries largely
accounts for this statistic. Between the mid-1500s and the late 1800s, an
estimated four million African slaves were transported to Brazil . In com-
parison, approximately 560,000 Africans were brought through the
transatlantic slave trade to the colonial and post-colonial United States
over the course of two centuries.' 3 This drastic disparity in the influx of
Africans contributed to the diverse demographic landscapes found in the
two American nations as well as their differing racial classification
schemes.
Throughout most of Brazil's colonial history, laws promulgated by
the Portuguese Crown forbidding marriage between whites and Blacks or
11. Robert Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial
Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REv. 11, 14 (2001).
12. BORIS FAUSTO, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BRAZIL 18 (Arthur Brakel trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 2006) (1999). See also HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 151 (Oxford University Press, 1986).
13. HERBERT S. KLEIN, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE 210-11 (Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
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Indians were in effect. 14 Eventually, the Crown permitted the marriage
between whites and caboclos (the offspring of an Indian and a white), yet
Blacks and mulattoes continued to be excluded.' s However, local condi-
tions in Brazil consistently mooted these anti-miscegenation laws.
Generally, in colonial Brazil, a small white population persisted; "[a]s late
as the seventeenth century, whites were predominantly European by
birth."' 6 Brazil encountered a shortage of Portuguese or white women,
especially during the first century of settlement. 7 In fact, according to
sociologist Carl Degler, by the eighteenth century "the number of black
women available as wives, concubines, or mistresses probably exceeded
the number of white men."'' 8 Combined, these conditions resulted in
"permissive attitudes toward miscegenation between white men and
women of African descent"' 9 and widespread miscegenation between
white men and Black women. However, in light of statistics Degler re-
ports in his pivotal comparative examination of slavery and race relations
in the United States and Brazil, Neither Black Nor White, white males and
Black female slaves could not have been entirely responsible for the per-
vasive miscegenation throughout Brazil.
Degler maintains that African male slaves were imported in signifi-
cantly greater numbers than females because they were stronger and able
to serve in more diverse occupational capacities. 20 Therefore, a plausible
inference could be made that sex between African male slaves and white
14. CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 213 (The MacMillan Company, 1971).
15. Id. See also Fausto, supra note 12, at 26 (noting "a 1755 decree went so far as to
encourage marriages between Indians and whites and maintained that there was 'nothing
wrong' with such unions ... [yet] years later, the viceroy of Brazil dismissed a militia chief
[who was an Indian] because he 'displayed sentiments so low to marry a black woman,
staining his blood with this union and making himself unworthy of the office of militia
chief"').
16. G. REGINALD DANIEL, RACE AND MULTIRACIALITY IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED
STATES: CONVERGING PATHs? 28 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
17. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 229. Professor Fausto also confirms that most of the
slaves brought from Africa were young men. Fausto, supra note 12, at 18. See also Donald
Pierson, NEGROES IN BRAZIL 111 (The University of Chicago Press, 1942) (explaining
"[d]uring at least the first century of colonization relatively few European women emi-
grated to Brazil" and the few European women initially settling the land were prostitutes
or orphans "sent out from Lisbon by the Crown at the insistent request of Padre No-
brega.").
18. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 229.
19. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 29. G. Reginald Daniel avers that despite legal prohibi-
tions against marriages between whites and Blacks throughout the majority of the colonial
period and a continuing bias against them after the ban was repealed, "[iun practice, fleet-
ing extra-marital relations, extended concubinage, common-law unions, and marriages
involving European men and women of color became the norm and were approved, if not
encouraged, by the prevailing unwritten moral code, as well as by the church and the
[Portuguese] Crown." Id.
20. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 66.
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and indigenous women was also largely responsible for the abounding
population of mixed-race persons in Brazil. Nonetheless, by 1822, over
one-third of the Brazilian population was enslaved.2' "Better than seventy. 21
percent of the population consisted of blacks or mulattoes, slave, liberto,
and free."23 In effect, the small white population and disproportionately
larger population of non-whites necessitated that Brazil adopt a racial
classification system mirroring this disproportion as well as the array of
physical appearances resulting from the influx of African slaves and preva-
lence of interracial sex.
Race-based slavery and colonization in Brazil produced an enduring
racial classification system. Brazilian racial classification schemes were im-
posed to safeguard the racial hierarchy by which a small minority of
wealthy, white Europeans occupied the highest strata of the social pyra-
mid, the free people of color the intermediate status, and the African
slaves the lowest position. In Brazil, "[w]hether one was free or enslaved
was closely linked to color and ethnicity."24 The demarcation between
persons and things, or free people and slaves, was embodied in colonial
Brazil's "nomenclature for racial mixtures: people were known as mulattos;
mamelucos, or mixtures of Indian and white; curibocas or caboclos, 'near
whites or descendants of white men'; and cafusos, or mixtures of Indians
and Blacks."21 Whites also created additional racial/status distinctions
21. Robert J. Cottrol, Normative Normalism: The Paradox of Egalitarian Law in Inegali-
tarian Cultures-Some Lessons From Recent Latin-American Historiography, 81 TUL. L. REV.
889, 896 (2007).
22. Liberto was an intermediate status between slavery and freedom. E.g., Fausto,
supra note 12, at 133. "The standard form for the manumission of slaves in Brazil was the
Alforria." Cottrol, Lingering Shadow, supra note 11, at 57. "The Alforria was given entirely
at the discretion of the slave owner, and was often accompanied by conditions." Id. Profes-
sor Boris Fausto further illustrates the quasi-free status of libertos:
Until 1865, a paid manumission could be revoked if an ex-master merely
claimed the person was ungrateful (known as "ingratitude"). On top of this,
on paper or in practice, being freed was often contingent on a set of restric-
tions, especially that of continuing to serve the old masters. Legislation after
1870 maintained this custom when it conditionally freed children and old
people.
FAUSTO, supra note 12, at 133.
Naturally, libertos' quasi-free status "maintained, or possibly increased, patron-client
ties between libertos and former masters." Cottrol, Normative Normalism, supra note 21, at
896 n.44. Significantly, "[the Brazilian] Constitution of 1824 made libertos citizens, al-
though they were prohibited from voting." Id. In fact, "the 1824 Constitution insured that
political power would remain in the hands of slaveholding elites ... [as] [p]roperty and
income qualifications for voting allowed few men who were not of the elite, slaveholding
class the opportunity to participate in politics." Id. at 897.
23. Id. at 896.
24. FAusTo, supra note 12, at 26.
25. Id. at 25-26.
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within the slave community "according to their origins, to the length of
time they [lived] in Brazil, and to their skin color."2 6 Typically, "mulattos
and crioulos (slaves of African descent born in Brazil) were preferred for
domestic service, as artisans, and as supervisors" and "[t]he darker slaves,
especially the [bofais, or African-born slaves], were given the heaviest
work" 27 Meanwhile, "at the top of the social pyramid were the wealthy
rural landowners and merchants engaged in foreign commerce ... [who]
combined to form the colonial dominating block presid[ing] over the
masses of slaves and freeman of lower social standing.
" 28
Conflated representations of race and status promulgated during
Brazil's colonial period proved to be quite influential; they were reflected
in official documentations after Brazil acquired its independence from
Portugal in 1823. Brazil's first national census taken in 1872 included the
following color/racial categories: white, preto, pardo, and caboclo.29 Pardos
were those offspring of the union of pretos and whites; caboclos were the
indigenous population and their descendants. 3 These four categories are
merely a sampling of the infinite and particularized racial categories that
emerged during slavery and since. 31 For example, anthropologist Harry
Hutchinson explicated the racial classification system found in the com-
munity of Reconcavo, located in Northeastern Brazil, during the 1950s.
32
From the lowest status to the most elevated, Carl Degler reports Hutchin-
son's findings:
Pretos (blacks) or preto retinto (dark black)
Cabra (slightly less than black)
Cabo verde (Cape Verde) (lighter than the preto but still quite
dark, but with straight hair, thin lips, and narrow, straight nose)
Escuro (literally meaning "the dark one," but is still lighter than
preto)
Mulato escuro (dark mulatto)
Mulato claro (light mulatto)
Pardo (light mulatto) Sarara (light skin with red or blond hair,
which is kinky and curled)
26. Id. at 27.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Piza and Rosemberg, supra note 5, at 40-41.
30. Id. at 41.
31. But see id. (asserting that the terms white, preto, and pardo are color categories
and not racial classifications, whereas caboclo "is rooted in ethnicity" and ancestry; therefore,
caboclo is a racial category).
32. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 102-03.
[VOL. 14:143
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Moreno (light skin with straight hair, but not viewed as white)
Branco (White)
33
In 1976, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem de Domicilios (the Na-
tional Household Survey or PNAD) conducted by the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics reported that Blacks classified themselves us-
ing 135 different terms.34 However, from his recent re-analysis of this
survey, Professor Edward E. Telles uncovered that the preponderance of
Brazilians used a few terms to self-classify: Branco, Moreno, Pardo, Moreno
Claro, Preto, Negro, and Clar. 3's
Brazilian racial classification schemes defining a person based on the
slightest variation of physical characteristics presumably associated with
Black ancestry and/or white ancestry could either elevate or demote an
individual on the racial ladder. The implementation of such a highly
stratified method of categorizing race evidences an extreme effort on be-
half of the white minority to preserve their economic, social, and political
dominance over masses of people of mixed and unmixed African descent.
Additionally, because of its relatively relaxed approach to manumission,
which contributed to the rapid growth of free people of color,3 6 it was
imperative for Brazil to develop a racial taxonomy based on infinite
physical distinctions that simultaneously maintained its racial hierarchy
and recognized the country's widespread miscegenation.37 Consequently,
Brazil's acknowledgement of the overwhelming presence of interracial sex
and marriage in its racial classification system, or what is currently coined
as "multi-racialism," was a natural response to conditions that Portu-
guese/Brazilian slavery and settlement produced.
Demography in the British colonies, however, sharply contrasted
that in colonial Brazil. z8 In most colonies, whites outnumbered people of
33. Id. at 103.
34. E.g., Reichmann, supra note 4, at 8.
35. TELLES, supra note 5, at 82.
36. See generally KLEIN, supra note 12, at 224-27 (emphasizing that the differences
between free non-white populations in Iberian and non-Iberian regions were partly at-
tributable to divergent attitudes toward manumission). According to Klein, "[b]y the
beginning of the 19th century freedmen had come close to surpassing the number of
slaves in most of the Iberian colonies" in contrast to non-Iberian areas, where freedmen
"represented but a small fraction of the slaves." Id. at 224.
37. Reichmann, supra note 4, at 7 (declaring "[i]n official accounts, the fluid color
line flows directly from miscegenation").
38. The racial demography in the United States continues to sharply contrast that of
Brazil. According to the United States Census, non-Hispanic Blacks constitute 12.3 per-
cent of the population, people of Hispanic origin 12.5 percent and whites 75.1 percent.
ELIZABEH M. GRIEco & RACHEL C. CASSIDY, OVERVIEW or RACE AND HIsFANic ORIGIN
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 3 (March 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/
cenbr01-1.pdf. Significantly, as the Hispanic population rises and public acknowledgment
of interracial unions increases, advocates have petitioned the United States Census Bureau
to include a multi-racial category on the Census. They have appropriated Brazil's
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African descent, South Carolina being a notable exception.3 9 "By 1700[,]
the total population of New England was approximately 90,000, of which
[B]lack residents numbered only one thousand."40 "Throughout the eight-
eenth century, [B]lack residents increased to 16,000 or 2.4 percent of the
population."'" The greatest population of Blacks lived in Massachusetts,
most of which resided in Boston and the largest proportion of Blacks
lived in Rhode IslandY In 1715, approximately 50,000 slaves and 369,200
whites resided in the British North American colonies.43
According to G. Reginald Daniel, "North Carolina and further
northward-particularly New England, and the Mid-Atlantic colonies of
NewYork, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware-were settled by large
numbers of Europeans with families.",44 "Where white women were pre-
sent in relatively significant numbers, as in colonial Virginia and Maryland,
miscegenation was less common or at least less openly acknowledged., 4' A
greater parity between white women and white men and the preservation
of the European family unit resulted in a more rigid posture toward mis-
cegenation in the British North American colonies than in Brazil.46
However, these demographic factors did not prevent interracial sex and
marriage in the British colonies and later, in free states. During the eight-
eenth century, "[f]ree white men married African slaves, sometimes the
only women they knew, and white female servants accepted offers of
marriage from black men, both slave and free."47 Nevertheless, in com-
parison to Brazil, the significantly lower importation of African slaves into
the colonies and states, the radically greater population of white settlers,
along with the more balanced ratio of white women and men contrib-
"multi-racial" view of race to buttress the implementation of this category. See generally
Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of
Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093
(2002) (discussing the movement for a multi-racial category on the U.S. Census and pro-
ponents' misguided reliance on Latin American racial classification methods and racial
ideology to bolster the category's adoption as a means of dismantling racism and racial
prejudice).
39. Cottrol, Lingering Shadow, supra note 11, at 29 n.74. See also Kevin Mumford,
After Hugh: Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America, 1630-1725, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
280, 302 (1999) (stating South Carolina was the first colony on record to report a Black
majority which included free Blacks and slaves).
40. Id. at 298.
41. Id.
42. See Id.
43. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 86.
44. Id. at 85.
45. George M. Fredrickson, Race and Racism in Historical Perspective: Comparing the
United States, South Africa, and Brazil, in BEYoND RACIsM, supra note 5, at 4.
46. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 85.
47. Id. at 87.
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uted to a smaller proportion of mixed-race offspring in the United
States .
Like in Brazil, racial classification schemes reflected the demography
of British North America. According to the late A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., and Barbara Kopytoff, "[i]n [colonial] Virginia, (one of two colonies to
create a legal definition of race) 49 there were only three racial classifica-
tions of any legal significance, though there were far more combinations
and permutations of racial mixture ... 'white,' 'Indian: and 'Negro and
mulatto.' -,o In 1705, the Virginia legislature designated the term, mulatto,
for a mixed-race individual who was "the child of an Indian, or the child,
grandchild, or great grandchild of a Negro."" On a national scale, Black
and mulatto categories were represented in each United States Census
from 1850 to 1920, except for 1880 and 1900.52 Census enumerators were
directed to distinguish precisely between blacks, mulattoes (an individual
who had three-eighths to five-eighths African ancestry), quadroons (an
individual possessing one-fourth African ancestry) and octoroons (one
who possessed one-eighth or less African ancestry).53
Significantly, the 1920 U.S. Census stopped making a distinction be-
tween mulattoes and Blacks; the mulatto category was deleted from the
Census. This extraction was not due to a change in demography, as multi-
racial North Americans continued to exist. As will be further discussed in
the next section, this amendment which grouped all mixed-race offspring
of Black and white unions into the Black category was motivated by
48. G. Reginald Daniel reports the statistical findings on the population of free
people of color as accounted in the 1850 U.S. Census:
[M]ulattoes composed a larger percentage (24.8 percent) of the African-
descent population in the North [who were free] than in the nation as a
whole (11.2 percent). The numbers of Free Coloreds in the Upper South
(203,702) exceeded those in the Lower South (34,485) and composed a lar-
ger percentage of the total African-descent population (12.5 percent versus
3.5 percent, respectively).... [T]here were larger numbers of blacks in the
ranks of Free Coloreds in the Upper South (78,556 mulattoes and 125,146
blacks) than in the Lower South (23,683 mulattoes and 10,802 blacks), be-
cause of the large-scale manumissions that took place around the time of the
American Revolution.... [T]he percentage of mulattoes in the ranks of Free
Coloreds in the Upper South (38.6 percent) was only little more than half of
the percentage in the Lower South (68.7 percent).
Id. at 96-97.
49. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial
Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J. 1967, 1976 (1989) (citing An
Act Declaring Who Shall Not Bear Office in This Country Ch. 4, 1705 VA. ACTS, 252).
North Carolina was the other colony to devise a legal definition of race. Id. at 1976 n.42.
50. Id. at 1976.
51. Id. at 1977.
52. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 116.
53. Id.
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notions of presumed impermeable racial boundaries--genetic and spacial-
which de jure and de facto segregation and the promotion of white racial
purity solidified. However, wholesale treatment and classification of mu-
lattoes as Blacks was not a new phenomenon in the United States.
"Throughout the antebellum period in Anglo North America, most
individuals of African descent, multiracial as well as black, were slaves. '4
In the North and Upper South whites represented the majority of the
population. Therefore, "to differentiate individuals of varying degrees of
African ancestry in order to gain the collaboration of multiracial indi-
viduals, whether slave or free, against a black slave majority,"" like in
Brazil, was not fundamental to the formation of British North America.
6
"The paucity of Portuguese settlers in Brazil left social and economic
space for a free Afro-Brazilian class capable of filling such roles as free arti-
san, truck farmer, and enlisted soldier, among others, that were filled by
poor whites in the slave societies of North America."'7 In Brazil, "mulat-
toes were also able to benefit from formal family ties with whites, such as
legal recognition as legitimate children of white fathers." ' In general, a
relatively greater acceptance of free people of color and the prospect of
their improved socio-economic status was present in Brazil than in British
North America.
Notably, in the South during the colonial period, a greater legal ac-
ceptance of free Blacks existed than during the nineteenth century
antebellum period. 9 After the colonies gained their independence from
Britain, "[the n]ew states settled or admitted into the Union in the nine-
teenth century tended to have a low legal tolerance for free blacks and
their small free Afro-American populations. 6 0 Because of the large popu-
lation of non-slaveholding whites, free Blacks and mulattoes were not
needed to serve in occupations critical to the success of the large-scale
plantation and slave economy of the South, like militia, slave overseers,
54. Id. at 96.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Cottrol, supra note 21, at 900. Compare DONALD PIERSON, NEGROES IN BRAZIL
161 (1942) (providing a cultural explanation for the greater presence of free Blacks and
mulattoes in certain employment sectors in Brazil than in the United States). According to
Donald Pierson,
Free blacks, as well as free mulattoes, were able to establish themselves in manual
occupations more readily than their brothers in the United States because the descendants
of Europeans in Brazil have ordinarily looked down upon manual labor, as attested by the
common saying: 'Trabalho 6 para cachorro e negro' (Work [that is, hard manual labor] is
for Negroes and dogs.
Id. at 161.
58. Cottrol, supra note 21, at 900-01.
59. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 47.
60. Id. at 49-50.
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truck farmers, and plantation managers. 6' Therefore, in most Southern
states, free Blacks and mulattoes did not occupy an intermediate status
between master and slave, between Black and white. Accordingly, in the
"U.S. South, any term describing a racially blended background generally
has included African ancestry, been equated with mulatto, and been trans-
lated into black. 62
The status of free Blacks and mulattoes in the South was unstable
and precarious. Fearful of free Blacks and mulattoes becoming socially
equal to whites and of slaves rebelling in order to attain this station, white
lawmakers severely restricted the freedom of free Blacks and mulattoes
and imposed upon them a perpetual condition of legal inferiority.63 Ac-
cording to historian Ira Berlin, "[t]hroughout the South, free Negroes
found their mobility curbed, their economic opportunities limited, and
their civil rights all but obliterated., 64 For example, in 1782, the Virginia
legislature mandated the enslavement of free Negroes who defaulted on
61their taxes. In 1793,Virginia also initiated the proscription of free Ne-
groes immigrating to the state.66 By 1795, free Blacks had to post a bond
of two hundred pounds as a prerequisite to enter North Carolina, and if
they did not fulfill this requirement, they were arrested, imprisoned, and
sold at a public auction. In 1800, South Carolina enacted an absolute
prohibition against the entry of free Blacks.""
Southern states also implemented registration systems for free
Blacks.6 9 The Virginia legislature "required urban free Negroes to register
with the town clerk ... [and a] free Negro who failed to register was
fined five dollars and could be sold into servitude .. ."'o Other southern
states followed Virginia's lead. Maryland adopted Virginia's system with
minimal changes in 1805, and in 1806,Tennessee implemented a compa-
rable registration system." The Georgia Assembly went even further by
not only passing registration laws for free Blacks but also "subjecting all
urban free Negroes to the same regulations as slaves. 7 2 Essentially,
61. Id. at 51-52.
62. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 128.
63. IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SouTH 97 (1974) ("Like slaves, free Negroes were generally without political rights, were
unable to move freely, were prohibited from testifying against whites, and were often pun-
ished with the lash. Indeed, the free Negro's only right that escaped unscathed was his
ability to hold property..
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id. at 92.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 93.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 94.
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antebellum Southern law and society treated free Blacks and mulattoes as
members of the most degraded class along with slaves.
The South was not alone in its similar treatment of Blacks and mu-
lattoes. For example, in 1697 the Massachusetts Bay colony mandated that
"'if any Negro,[or] Molatto, shall conit Fornication with an English'
then [he] 'shall be whipped'.,
73
In Boston, Massachusetts, mulattoes were not allowed to keep
hogs or swine without a master's consent. Additionally, mulatto
servants like Blacks, had a 9:00 p.m. curfew. In NewYork City,
mulattoes could not sell oysters, and in the State of NewYork,
mulattoes could not enjoy, hold, or possess certain forms of real
property.
74
Furthermore, large groups of European immigrants settled in the
North who occupied lower level positions in the Northern industrialized
economy, which prevented free Blacks and mulattoes from occupying an
intermediate position similar to Brazilian free people of color in urban
75
areas.
As in the South, free Blacks and mulattoes in the North occupied
the lowest level in the social and racial hierarchy. This unique grouping of
free Blacks and mulattoes in the same class as slaves throughout most of
the South and mulattoes with Blacks in the North has had a long-lasting
influence on the North American view of Black and white. Currently, in
the United States, Blackness and whiteness are conceived as "hermetically
sealed, mutually exclusive categories., 76 In fact, it was not until the year
2000 that the United States Census Bureau allowed census respondents to
select multiple racial and ethnic categories.7
A. Race, Racial Ideology, and Racial Hierarchy
In Brazil and the United States, the law of slavery developed and
enhanced the social constructs of race, racial hierarchy as well as racial
ideologies that permeate current understandings of race throughout the
Americas. However, when comparing slavery law and its consequences it
is easy to over-generalize a legal institution, which lasted for over four
73. Mumford, supra note 39, at 293.
74. John Terrence A. Rosenthal, Batson Revisited in America's "New Era" of Multiracial
Persons, 33 SETON HALL L. R.v. 67,77 (2002).
75. See DANIEL, supra note 16, at 108.
76. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 52.
77. NiCHoiAs A. JoNEs & AMY SYMENS SMITH, THE TWO OR MORE RACES POPULA-
TION: 2000 CENSUs 2000 BRaEF 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001pubs/c2kbr01-6.pdf. According to the United States Census Bureau, 6.8 million
people self-identified as more than race. Id. at 1.
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centuries in Brazil and over two centuries in the United States, and its
effects.Yet, at least one postulate concerning race-based slavery across the
Americas can be safely articulated: inherent in American slavery law was
the presumption of natural inferiority of Africans and African descendants
and superiority of whites. Unfortunately, this fundamental principle that
facilitated the systematic subordination of African descendants continues
to influence American ideals concerning Blackness and whiteness. Indeed,
at the axis of their respective national ideologies-racial democracy in
Brazil and racial purity in the United States-is the privileging of white-
ness and the debasement of Blackness.
B. Brazil: A "Racial Democracy"
"Serious work on the comparative history of race relations began in
the 1940s and 1950s with studies of slavery and its consequences in the
United States and Latin America." 78 In his seminal comparative work,
Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas, anthropologist Frank Tan-
nenbaum theorized that Spanish and Iberian slave codes' recognition of
slaves' humanity, the paternalistic role of the Catholic Church in the insti-
tution of slavery, and slave masters' relatively "milder" treatment of slaves
in Brazil were responsible for the greater reception of people of color in
the citizenry and a more fluid concept of race in Latin America than in
the United States.79 However, numerous variables, such as regional varia-
tions, culture, religion, economic controls, racial and gender ratios, and
class structure influenced the adoption and adherence to slavery laws and
their impact on social thinking and practices.
To encapsulate over four hundred years of law and its effects simply
does not account for the myriad changes that naturally occur over time.
Yet, the presence of an already-existing body of slavery law which the
Portuguese settlers were familiar with and could easily appropriate as they
settled and exploited the land with the help of their free labor source-
indigenous and African peoples--significantly influenced the contours of
Brazilian racial ideology, which openly acknowledged multi-racialism.
Conversely, the absence of slavery law that British settlers could utilize as
they exploited Native American and African labor to develop the colonial
and post-colonial United States shaped an American racial ideology that
simultaneously recognized interracial sex and endorsed racial purity.
By the time the Portuguese commenced colonizing Brazil, their
dealings with slavery in general and specifically African slave labor were
quite extensive. In the early 1400s, Portuguese explorers and traders ar-
rived on the sub-Saharan coast with the primary interest of exploiting
78. Fredrickson, supra note 45, at 3.
79. See FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS
(1947).
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gold and slaves, with pepper, ivory, and other products as a secondary in-
terest.80 However,
... only with the introduction of sugar production to the Atlantic
islands and the opening up of the Western Hemisphere to European con-
quest at the end of the 15th century [was] a new and important use found
for slaves ... Portuguese interest in its African trade slowly shifted from a
concern with gold and ivory to one primarily stressing slaves. 8'
Even before delving into the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the Portu-
guese possessed well-developed slave codes deriving from the slave law of
ancient Rome. Roman slave law treated slaves as chattel for purposes of
the commercial codes and as persons for purposes of the criminal codes.
Portuguese and later Brazilian slave codes prescribed methods of manu-
mitting and disciplining slaves closely resembling those found in Roman
law. The Portuguese/Brazilian manumission policies largely contributed to
the expansive class of free people of color and their acceptance into larger
society. There was a sizable class of free or manumitted Africans and Afro-
Brazilians during the Brazilian colonial period . Indeed, at the close of
the Brazilian colonial period nearly 42 percent of Blacks and mulattoes
were free.83
However, like their Roman predecessor, Portuguese/Brazilian slave
systems deemed emancipation as a "fundamental right of masters to dis-
pose of their [slave] property as they saw fit" 84 "[M]anumission could also
occur at the will of the slave or the state, and this could be done in the
name of state interest or even of economic efficiency!'8 Also in accor-
dance with Roman legal precedent, slave law in Brazil dictated that
children of masters and slave women were to be freed at birth8 6 Although
"[a] number of masters simply disregarded this rule, keeping their children
enslaved. The doctrine's importance as a legal norm nonetheless should
not be overlooked [nor should the] significan[ce] that U.S. law did not
recognize a similar doctrine."8'
In Brazil, slaves could also enter into enforceable contracts with their
masters for their manumission.8 8 Unlike other American slave societies,
"Iberian [slave societies] not only continued to accept and support the
traditional methods of manumission but also actively accepted and codi-
fied the [slave's] route of self purchase. '89 Self-purchase arrangements
80. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 14.
81. Id.
82. FAusTo, supra note 12, at 27.
83. Id.
84. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 5.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 56.
87. Id. at 56-57.
88. Cottrol, supra note 21, at 904-05.
89. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 220.
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"further encouraged the growing number of freedmen, who in turn gave
their support to increasing levels of manumission." 9 In Brazil, the free
colored population grew at an enormous rate throughout the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Even the massive arrival of African slaves in the
nineteenth century did not impede the growth of this population. 9 In
fact, by the time the slave trade ended in Brazil, the population of free
colored people exceeded the numbers of the total number of slaves. 2 By
the time of Brazil's first national census in 1872, there were a reported 4.2
million free colored persons compared to 1.5 million slaves and 3.8 mil-
lion whites.93
Naturally, slave codes not only sought to control the behavior and
status of slaves, but also the activity and rank of the growing population of
free colored citizens and libertos, or freed slaves. Significantly, under Portu-
guese and Brazilian slave law free people of color and libertos were given
full citizenship.94 However, citizenship did not bring about equality for
free people of color and former slaves. Indeed, Professor Herbert Klein
contends, "[t]he laws and practices of the Ibero-American societies were
those of an essentially racist society in which free blacks and mulattoes
would enter as lower caste within a highly stratified system."9 Professor
Boris Fausto refers to the freedom of free Blacks and mulattoes during
the colonial period as "ambiguous".96 According to Fausto, "[w]hile they
were formally considered free, in practice [free Blacks and mulattoes]
ended up being arbitrarily enslaved, especially when their color or their
features identified them as black." Furthermore, sumptuary laws denied
free colored women the right to wear clothes and jewelry worn by free
white women; free colored persons the right to a university education
and the practice of a liberal profession; 97 and even free people of color the
entry to some skilled professions.98 Undoubtedly, regulation of "colored"
bodies and the lack of control over white bodies buttressed the presumed
inferiority of African descendants and the putative superiority of whites
in Brazilian social thinking.
The "fluid" multi-racial categories, the absence of anti-
miscegenation statutes, the comparatively greater vertical and horizontal
mobility of African descendants in addition to the nonexistence of de jure
racial segregation (unlike in the United States) during and after slavery in
Brazil, indeed, helped to make the country's designation as a "racial
90. Id.
91. Id. at 223.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 56.
95. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 219.
96. FAuSTO, supra note 12, at 27.
97. KLEIN, supra note 12 , at 219.
98. See id.
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democracy" possible. However, these distinctive dynamics of Brazilian
socio-legal institutions did not indicate national approval of racial mixing
and its visible African heritage. In fact, "Brazil entered the twentieth cen-
tury a society highly stratified by race with significant degrees of color
prejudice."99 Professor Robert Cottrol notes that "[t]hose prejudices and
stratifications would in turn be augmented by the growth of scientific
racism in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of
the twentieth [century]."'°° Based on notions of heredity, psuedo-scientific
theories were promulgated and disseminated in an effort to "improve" the
human race. Public policy makers around the world were largely influ-
enced by eugenicists' theories, triggering social policies which reified
white (genetic) superiority and Black (genetic) inferiority.
Brazilians created a unique variety of eugenics to specifically handle
Brazil's "race problem"--the country's allegedly "inferior" gene pool at-
tributed to its large presence of Blacks and mulattoes."" "Brazilian scholars
used a theory of constructive miscegenation and proposed a solution of
'whitening' through the mixing of whites and nonwhites."'0 ' Whitening,
as prescribed by eugenicists, became the major basis of Brazil's immigra-
tion policy.10 3 To facilitate the goal of "whitening" the country, Brazilian
states implemented policies to recruit European settlement, in addition to
financial incentives, while the federal government expressly barred African
and Asian immigration.
0 4
By the 1890s, Brazil loosened their restrictions on Asian inimigra-
tion, permitting Chinese and Japanese immigrants and eventually allotting
five percent of the total number of immigrants each year to Asian entry.'05
However, policies continued to forbid native peoples of African nations
from settling in Brazil.' 6 In 1934, the new Brazilian constitution only al-
lowed whites to immigrate into Brazil and even barred "the settlement of
blacks or Asians regardless of their country of origins, a measure presuma-
bly designed to curtail immigration from other Latin American
nations.' '0 7 Brazilian policy makers hoped to replace the labor force for-
merly consisting of African slaves with European immigrants while
simultaneously "whitening the Brazilian gene pool" and "diluting Brazil's
large Black population."'0 8 In fact, the Brazilian delegate announced to the
99. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 63.
100. Id.
101. E.g., TELLES, supra note 5, at 28.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 64. See also, e.g., TELLES, supra note 5, at 29.
105. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 64.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. TELLES, supra note 5, at 29. See also Reichmann, supra note 4, at 24 (affirming
that "Gilberto Freyre's works were widely hailed as the definitive portrait of Brazil's
[VOL. 14:143
Determining the (In)Determinable
1911 Universal Races Congress in London that the national mission was
to eliminate African descendants by the year 2 012.'9 To fully achieve its
goal of whitening the population through the gradual extinguishment of
Blacks, the Brazilian government also promoted racial intermixing."
0
The publication of Gilberto Freyre's Casa Grande e Senzales (The
Masters and the Slaves)"' alone "transformed the concept of miscegenation
from its former pejorative connotation into a positive national character-
istic and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture.' ' 1 2 According to
Freyre, Brazil's extensive miscegenation bolstered "Brazil's harmonious
race relations and its racial democracy."'1"3 Inspired by Freyre's suppositions,
Brazil began to publicly embrace its multi-racial character and no longer
overtly espoused a racial ideology amounting Brazil's widespread misce-
genation to a nation imbedded with racial inferiority. Brazil's
miscegenation and representative racial classifications, fashioned in large
part by Brazil's slave law, now symbolized a "racial democracy"-a coun-
try populated with persons neither Black nor white but simply Brazilian.
Brazilians were consequently viewed as a desirable amalgamation of the
country's European, indigenous and African racial and cultural constitu-
ents.
C. The United States:A "Racially Pure" Nation
Unlike the Portuguese, British colonists who settled the eastern sea-
board of the colonial United States did not have a well-developed body
of slavery law to employ while appropriating Native Americans and Afri-
cans as their free labor source. British common law did not acknowledge
slavery. In fact the common law deemed slavery as "unlawful, contrary to
unique racial 'paradise,' formalizing the popular myth of racial democracy and giving it the
legitimacy of social scientist's stamp").
109. Nascimento and Nascimento, supra note 9, at 121 (citing THOMAS E. SKIDMORE,
BLACK INTO WHITE: RACE AND NATIONALITY IN BRAZILIAN THOUGHT Oxford University
Press (1974)).
110. john a. powell, Transformative Action: A Strategy for Ending Racial Hierarchy and
Achieving True Democracy, in BEYOND RACISM, supra note 5, at 371,378.
111. Gilberto Freyre, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF BRAZILIAN CIVILIZATION (Samuel Putnam, trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2d. English ed. 1966)
(1946).
112. TELLES, supra note 5, at 33.
113. EDNA ROLAND, The Soda Cracker Dilemma, in RACE IN CONTEMPORARY BRZIL,
supra note 4, at 195,197.
114. Elisa Larkin Nascimento, It's in the Blood: Notes on Race Attitudes in Brazil from a
Different Perspective, in BEYOND RACISM, supra note 5, at 509, 510 (acknowledging "since the
publication of Gilberto Freyre's works in the 1930s, Brazil's social fabric and national per-
sonality absorbed not only the ideal of antiracialism but also a positive value change
elevating the society's perception and acceptance of African descendants and their cul-
ture").
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natural law, and an institution that could not be maintained in England."" '
Therefore, it was necessary for the British colonists to formulate support-
able explanations for their aberrant system of human bondage.
Significantly, the British initially rationalized the enslavement of Native
Americans and Africans on religious bases.'1 6 Yet, as Native Americans and
Africans increasingly converted to Christianity, religious differences could
no longer serve as a viable justification for their enslavement."7
Eventually, British colonists, like the Portuguese, created a system of
human slavery based on physical appearances, or rather the distinctions
between readily identifiable features. Furthermore, British colonists and
later Americans had to develop even more elaborate rationalizations for
the enslavement of humans, as they touted liberal philosophies of liberty,
equality and natural rights of men. Thus, white slave owners, philosophers,
and politicians, like Thomas Jefferson, articulated formal defenses of slav-
ery in concert with the country's philosophical origins, yet grounded in
the presumption of whites' natural superiority and Blacks' innate inferior-
ity.
Also, in contrast with Brazil, U.S. slavery law was not generally sym-
pathetic to miscegenation and emancipation. They were both viewed as
perils to an entrenched legal, social, political and economic hierarchy
based on race." 8 In a world where slavery was increasingly justified on the
115. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 45.
116. E.g., EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 331-33 (1975).
117. E.g., Id.
118. In the United States, the level of receptivity or hostility to manumission fluctu-
ated over the course of two hundred plus years of legalized slavery. Acclaimed historian Ira
Berlin explains in SLAVEs WITHOUT MASTERS:THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
that after the American Revolution, manumissions increased significantly throughout the
North and the South. Supra, note 63. By 1805, all Northern states provided for gradual
emancipation. Id. at 21. By 1810, more than 100,000 free Blacks lived in the South, con-
sisting of five percent of the free population and approximately nine percent of the overall
Black population. Id. at 15. On the heels of the War, Southern states repealed prohibitions
against private manumission of slaves and liberalized manumission statutes. Id. at 29. Im-
mediately after the Revolutionary War, a significant amount of slaveholders, in part
motivated by religious doctrine and espousals of liberty, also freed their slaves. See id. at 30.
Generally, whites' sentiments concerning free and enslaved Blacks had become more re-
laxed. Accordingly, "[clonfronted with the growing number of freedom suits, Southern
courts occasionally responded sympathetically by liberalizing the rule of descent and ex-
panding the range of evidence acceptable in freedom suits." Id. at 33. This overarching
general receptiveness to freedom triggered the rapid escalation of free Blacks in the South.
See generally id. at 49. Indeed, "[bly 1810, the 108,000 free Negroes were the fastest-
growing element in the Southern population ... [and despite the rapid growth of South-
ern whites and slaves] the free Negro population outstripped both." Id. at 49. However,
not too long after the Revolutionary War, both the Lower and Upper South began re-
stricting manumission. In 1806,Virginia required all Blacks to leave the state a year after
being freed or they faced summary re-enslavement. Id. at 102. South Carolina began regu-
lating manumissions for the first time and Georgia completely barred private manumission
of slaves. Id. at 101.
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racial grounds of both the inherent inferiority and the dependent nature
of blacks, the presence of free, "self-sufficient blacks provided a stark and
unwelcome contradiction to the reigning ideology."1 9 White male legisla-
tors "did not intend for blacks to be considered as human beings within a
state of society, and thus free and independent persons with 'inherent
rights.' ""2 0Therefore, in both the North and the South, offspring of Black
and white unions may have been termed "mulatto" but they were
grouped with Blacks, subject to like disabilities and degradation. 2 '
The nomenclature promulgated in British North America in tan-
dem with U.S. slave law recognized the existence of interracial sex yet did
not finely distinguish physical characteristics exhibited by offspring of
interracial unions as did the Brazilian racial classification systems. None-
theless, during the antebellum era, the determination of race centered on
an individual's phenotype and ancestry-not on exact proportions of
"blood". 2 2 Daniel Sharfstein maintains that "the [one-drop] rule's
119. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 51.
120. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL PROCEss:THE COLONIAL PERIOD 59 (1978).
121. See generally Berlin, supra note 63. Race and racial boundaries are quite contex-
tual. Therefore, a monolithic experience for people of African descent does not exist. The
diverse experiences of African descendants in the United States largely depended on de-
mography, economic factors, and socio-legal controls. For example, after the Haitian
Revolution the Lower South experienced a large influx of free people of color from Saint
Dorningue and Haiti. Id. at 35-36, 114-15. As a result, a sizeable intermediate class of free
people of color developed in the Lower South mostly consisting of mulattoes. Id. at 99.
According to Berlin, "[t]he elevated status of the free people of color and the lowly condi-
tion of slaves in the Lower South allowed a three-caste system much like that of the West
Indies to develop wherever free Negroes were numerous." Id. at 198. Free people of color
were often utilized as a buffer class against Indian and slave revolts and tensions between
slaves and whites. Id. at 112, 214.Whites supported the prosperity of and the provision of
rights to free people of color; even permitting free people of color "to vote, to testify in
court, and ultimately to pass in to the white caste." Id. at 214. Furthermore, free Blacks in
the Lower South "collect their own wages, accumulate property, and control their own
family life" which distinguished them greatly from slaves. Id. at 233. A number of free
Blacks accumulated significant material and social wealth. See generally id. at 271-83. How-
ever, in the Upper South according to Berlin," [tihe fact that Upper South freemen, like
slaves, were overwhelmingly black in color and rural in residence reinforced the long-
standing belief that free blacks were more black than free." Id. at 188. Therefore, whites in
the Upper South did not view free Blacks as capable of serving as a buffer between whites
and slaves and did not use them in this capacity as frequently as in the Lower South. See
id. at 189. Despite the distinctions, free Blacks were still quite marginalized and suffered
numerous disabilities in the Upper South and Lower South.
122. During the antebellum period, some states did not enact statutes defining the
requisite amount of African ancestry making a person non-white. For example, in 1835,
Missouri enacted a statute barring Blacks and mulattoes from marrying whites as did Ar-
kansas in 1838. CHARLES F. ROBINSON, II, DANGEROUS LIASIONS: SEX AND LovE IN THE
SEGREGATED SoUTm 10 (2003). Similarly, as of 1831 the South Carolina legislature had not
established any proportions of blood defining who was white, mulatto, or negro. State v.
Hanna, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558 (S.C. App. 1831). In fact, in South Carolina, until the 1840s
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growing ideological prevalence in the free North ... presage[d] its even-
tual codification in the South after slavery's demise.' Ironically, the one-
drop rule was first widely propagated by Northern abolitionists in their
fight for freedom:
The strategic equation of everyone who was socially recog-
nized as black with anyone who had "one-drop of African
blood in his veins" helped abolitionists articulate the inhuman-
ity of Southern statutes and the unreasonable extremes
demanded by the slave power. Abolitionists invoked the one-
drop rule most often not in castigating the South for turning
free blacks into slaves, but rather in showing that the South
could enslave free whites."'
Therefore, decades before Southerners embraced the rule of hypo-
descent and almost one hundred years prior to its codification by a
Southern legislature, Northerners advanced the notion that Blackness
derived from one African ancestor. Additionally, Northerners predated the
South in its system of racial segregation and proscription. According to
historian C. Vann Woodward, these mechanisms of subordination were
rooted in the North and had "reached an advanced age before moving
South in force."
1 2
Not until serious threats of abolition, and thus the portended demise
of white supremacy, materialized in the South did Southerners respond
with a peculiar defense of slavery: the maintenance of white racial identity.
With the loss of the Civil War and the entrance of millions of freed Blacks
of mixed and unmixed descent into society, Southerners fought arduously
to perpetuate the status quo established during slavery. Southerners
thereby appropriated ideals of white racial purity and the one-drop rule
to ensure the continued subordination of Blacks and other people of
color and supremacy of whites.
Ideology and law aimed to preserve the "purity" of the white race
gained muscle after the Civil War and reached their apex in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Jim Crow laws mandating "separate
but equal" public accommodations, inferior public schools for Blacks,
both known and visible mulattoes could become white by behavior and reputation and
could marry into white families. F James Davis, WHO Is BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINI-
TION 35 (1991). Like Brazil, "in South Carolina mulattoes who were 'proper acting,' a
quality determined by their wealth and education, could even apply for legal standing as
'White.'"Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Lav of Skin Color, 49 DuKE L.J. 1487, 1509
(2000).
123. Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop
Rule, 1600-1800,91 MINN. L. REv. 592,597 (2007).
124. Id. at 651.
125. C.VANN WoODwARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 17 (Oxford Univ. Press
2d rev. ed. 1966) (1955).
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residential segregation, and in some states, separate Bibles for whites and
Blacks testifying in court became the norm throughout the South by the
late 1800s. 126 Then, in 1896, the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson decreed "separate but equal" the law of the land.
27
"[B]y 1890 every Southern state except one, Louisiana, had placed
an anti-miscegenation law in its civil code, and most state supreme courts
has affirmed the law's constitutionality.''2 8 Anti-miscegenation statutes
defined the legal quotient of African ancestry to make an individual le-
gally Black and provided harsh penalties for those individuals who
contravened these statutes. 29 According to Charles E Robinson, II,
[t]he Progressive Era witnessed an expansion of the rhetorical
opposition to miscegenation. Through speeches and profes-
sional and popular writings, progressives expressed their
unequivocal hostility to all notions of racial mixing. Progres-
sives also widened the intimacy color line by enacting tougher
anti-miscegenation laws. At both the state and city levels, legis-
lators enhanced penalties for violations and decreased the
amount of African ancestry that a person could have and le-
gally marry whites. With such measures progressives hoped to
eradicate the interracial coupling.
3 0
For the first time in United States history, in 1924, Virginia passed
the first anti-miscegenation statute adopting the one-drop rule.' 3' As a
result, whites were prohibited from marrying an individual with any
known racial ancestry aside from white.3 2 Other states and municipalities
soon followed in Virginia's footsteps. 33 Consequently, these statutes con-
ferred upon persons of mixed African and white ancestry a degraded and
restricted legal status that denied them the opportunity to garner the
rights and privileges associated with possessing "pure white blood". With
slavery law in their lineage, racial segregation laws and anti-miscegenation
126. See generally id.
127. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
128. ROBINSON, supra note 122, at 49.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 97.
131. Id. at 101.
132. Id. Interestingly, most anti-miscegenation statutes prohibited interracial marriage
and not sex, according to Robinson. Accordingly, the enforcement of these anti-
miscegenation statutes targeted public, domestic interracial relationships. Id. at 103-04.
133. Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi also passed more restrictive anti-
miscegenation laws during the 1920s. Id. at 101. Also, Houston, Texas passed an ordinance
which banned whites from cohabiting or having sexual intercourse with persons of Afri-
can descent and in doing so, broadened the definition of Black persons from the third
generation rule adopted by the State to one including any person with "African blood in
his or her veins of whatever quantity." See id. at 103.
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statutes, which clearly demarcated the boundaries of Blackness and
whiteness, erupted throughout the South. Together these laws cultivated
modern American racial ideology: the espousal of racial purity and the
hypodescent rule.-
4
Though numerous states passed laws defining the requisite quota of
African ancestry that made an individual legally Black, in day to day af-
fairs when racial distinctions were attempted to be made, a person's
appearance mattered most.' 35 Nevertheless, by the twentieth century, the
racial purity ideology white Southerners advanced in their quest for con-
tinued white supremacy-which arguably originated in the North-
solidified the modern U.S. concept that the presence of one African an-
cestor defines Blackness and the lack thereof defines whiteness. Merely
possessing white ancestry could no longer facilitate ascension within the
North American racial hierarchy.
Indeed, the discovery of Black ancestry for those who physically ap-
peared white could automatically relegate such persons to Blackness, the
most degraded class. 136 Branquamiento--the ideal of whitening one's self
and/or children by marrying a white person or accumulating material
wealth-has been widely accepted in Brazil, but was essentially impossible
for those who physically appeared non-white in the United States. The
reality in Brazil "that some white ancestry, coupled perhaps with social
position, could make an individual white despite some [known] Afro-
American history,''3 7 was impractical in the United States by the early
twentieth century.
134. Professor Robert Cottrol also explains that at the beginning of the twentieth
century, unlike Brazil, the interest of the United States was not to "whiten" the population.
Supra note 11, at 65. Brazil's demography played a key role in the development of its racial
ideology of racial democracy. Demography in the United States similarly influenced the
development of its racial ideology of racial purity. According to Professor Cottrol, "the
expressed concerns of white North Americans [who historically constituted nearly a
ninety percent majority] were in maintaining a white majority and preserving the racial
purity of the U.S. white population."). Id.
135. RoBINsoN, supra note 122, at 55.
136. Wall v. Oyster, 36 App.D.C. 50, 1910 WL 20844 (App. D.C. 1910). In Wall v.
Oyster, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that a young girl, whose father
was seven-eighths Black and whose mother was white, was "colored" or Black, despite the
girl's "white physical appearance" and neighbors' and friends' treatment of her as white. Id.
at 1, 5. In issuing its ruling, the court acknowledged the urgent petitioning of the court to
save the young girl from "a cruel hardship [that] will be inflicted upon [her]" if the court
determined she was colored. See id. at 5. Such a ruling would prohibit the girl from at-
tending a white secondary public school and force her to attend a "separate but equal"
school reserved for colored children. See id. at 1.
137. See Cottrol, supra note 11, at 66.
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D. Brazil and the United States:
A Transnational Concept of Race and Racial Hierarchy
In Brazil, notions of racial purity for whites like those espoused in
the United States are essentially nonexistent. 13 ' Also, unlike the United
States, where segregation separated the population into black and white,
Brazil has celebrated middle categories and avoided legislating rules for
racial classification. 139 However, despite the contrasts in demography, slave
law, and ensuing racial ideology-racial democracy in Brazil and racial
purity in the United States-the enslavement and subordination of Afri-
cans and their descendants in Brazil and the United States spawned a
common racial hierarchy. Within this mutual racial hierarchy whiteness
symbolized the most esteemed and privileged status-an identity to seek
and acquire-and Blackness signified the most debased and marginal-
ized-an identity from which to escape. Scholars posit that that the
"spectrum of classifications" Afro-Brazilians have recently employed for
self-identification purposes "reflect a desire to be identified as 'not totally
black" or 'almost white,' thus diminishing the social negativity that their
African blood conferred."
1 40
Moreover, the construction of phenotypes associated with Blackness
and whiteness, in order to bestow the attendant privilege or debasement,
also transcended demographic, legal and philosophical differences. The
paradoxical yet unifying nature of racial formation in the Americas-what
G. Reginald Daniel coins the "ternary racial project"'4 1 or the division of
the population into whites, multiracial individuals and Blacks-is the
guarantee that "multiracial individuals [are] stigmatized for every feature
they shared with blacks and rewarded for every degree of approximation
to the European psychosomatic norm.' 4 2 Accordingly, Brazil and the
United States' mutual physiognomy of Blackness and whiteness have de-
termined one's race and status in both American societies, which the
following sections examine more fully.
138. TELLES, supra note 5, at 105.
139. Id.
140. Reichmann, supra note 4, at 8 (citing Sueli Carneiro referring to the 1976 Na-
tional Household Survey (PNAD) conducted by the IBGE requesting 50,000 respondents
to state their race or color without any predetermined categories whereby 135 identifying
terms were used by the participants). Reichmann also reports more recent findings by
United Nations Rapporteur Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, who also observed that "when
subjects were asked to identify their color in the 1991 national census, more than a hun-
dred shades of color were 'used to describe themselves, out of a desire to distance
themselves as far as possible from the colour black'" Id.
141. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 34.
142. Id.
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II. CONSTRUCTING RACE:THE ROLE OF U.S. COURTS
Throughout United States history, white lawmakers designed laws
delegating racialized rights, privileges, and disabilities; foremost was the
legal system of racial slavery. Accordingly, race dictated the provision or
denial of numerous rights-the rights to freedom, bearing arms, voting,
owning property, holding a political office, serving as a juror, and even
becoming a citizen-all of which were expressly reserved for whites.
When these rights and others were desired by individuals whose "white-
ness" was questionable, colonial and post-colonial U.S. courts were often
assigned the important task of clarifying this ambiguity by determining
the individual's race. Like the law of slavery, racial determination case law
is essential to the construction and maintenance of race, racial ideology,
and racial hierarchy.
This section surveys historical and contemporary racial determina-
tion cases decided by U.S. courts. In doing so, this case analysis
deconstructs a widely accepted tenet-in the United States, one's race is
objective and fixed-by illustrating that race is a subjective, contextual,
and malleable construct. Thus, when U.S. courts determined an individ-
ual's race, often simultaneously determining the person's legal, social, and
political status, they often adopted new criteria and presumptions, or ma-
nipulated prongs of a previously established racial determination test to
achieve a desired outcome. Moreover, courts historically and presently
have relied heavily on physical constructs of race in promulgating various
determination methods. The following chronological overview of racial
determination cases exposes the salience of physical appearance and the
inoperativeness of the hypodescent rule in determining an individual's
Blackness or whiteness when put into question and, therefore, the com-
monality of determining race in the United States and Brazil.
A. Race as Physical Appearance and Beyond in the Nineteenth Century:
Hudgins v.Wright and White v.Tax Collector
Throughout United States history, ascertaining whether an individ-
ual is white, Black, or neither has been an extremely important quest for
judges and juries. Hudgins v. Wright,13 one of the most widely discussed
freedom suits, which was decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia in 1806, highlights the very essence of racial determination in
the Americas as well as the significance of defining race. In Hudgins, three
generations of women petitioned the court for their freedom. Jacky,
Maria, and Epsabar Wright alleged they were the descendants of a Native
American woman by the name of Butterwood Nan.144 However, Hudgins,
143. 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
144. Id.
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a slaveowner, claimed "that they were descended from a negro woman by
an Indian"' 14' and thus, were Black and his slaves. 146 The court's determina-
tion of the Wrights' race as Native American or Black was momentous,
for Hudgins was decided at "a time when the determination of a person's
race as black in Virginia was life-altering in a way that could establish
bondage or freedom, and, in some cases life or death.'
47
By 1806, the colonial legislature of Virginia had departed from the
English common law rule declaring that an individual's status derived
from his or her paternal line. The colonial body adopted the rule partus
sequitur ventrem, by which an individual's status follows his or her maternal
line. 14 8 Accordingly, three generations-mother, daughter, and grand-
daughter-rested their claim to freedom on the presence of free Native
American female ancestors on their maternal side. Several witnesses testi-
fied that Butterwood Nan and her father were known to be Indian, 49 and
Butterwood Nan's daughter, Hannah, was regarded in the community as
an Indian and possessed "long black hair [and] the right Indian copper
colour.'"50 However, the fact that Jacky, Maria, and Epsabar Wright, all of
varied gradations of color, visibly appeared white to the jurists, rendered
them free.' 5'
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: The
Story of Hudgins v. Wrights, in RACE LAW STOIES 147, 148 (Rachel E Moran and DevonW
Carbado eds., 2008).
148. In 1662, the colonial legislature passed an act which declared that the free or
slave status of children conceived by a Negro woman and an English father followed the
slave or free condition of the mother. E.g.,MORGAN, supra note 116, at 333.
149. Hudgins, 11Va (1 Hen. & M.) at 142.
150. Id. at 134.
151. According to Professor Onwuachi-Willig, the trial court judge, Chancellor
Wythe rejected Hudgins' claim and granted the women their freedom on two bases: "(1)
[t]he women did not look black, but instead had the appearance of a person of white and
American Indian ancestry; and (2) [s]lavery violated Virginia's Declaration of Rights and
thus was illegal in the state." Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 147, at 155. However, on appeal
Judge Tucker sustained Chancellor Wythe's conclusion yet "rejected his former teacher
Chancellor Wythe's decision ... to grant the Wrights freedom on the grounds that slavery
was illegal in Virginia." Id. at 163. Consequently, Judge Tucker affirmed Chancellor Wythe's
initial ground for granting the Wrights' freedom-their "white" physical appearance. In-
deed, the trial and appellate judges were influenced by the Wrights' whiteness. See id. at
155-56 (reporting that Hudgins' attorney, Edmund Randolph, "insisted [on appeal] that
Chancellor Wythe had been improperly influenced by the plaintiff's white appearance ...
[and that] their physical appearance was not an appropriate basis for decision, for
'[w]hether they are white or not, cannot appear to this Court from the record.' ") (quoting
Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 134-35). See also Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 141
(Roane concurring: "[i]n the present case it is not and cannot be denied that [the Wrights]
have entirely the appearance of white people .... "). But see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note
147, at 165 (opining that the Wrights' "fate as either free American Indian women or le-
gally-defined black slaves depended not just upon the fairness of their skin or the
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By recognizing these three women were of mixed white and Native
American ancestry, the court simultaneously accepted the existence of
miscegenation and the inexistence of white racial purity. According to
Daniel Sharfstein, "the litigants were living proof that dark could become
light. 112 Although they claimed Native American ancestry, they appeared
indistinguishable from the lawyers and judges and relied upon this fact in
their quest for freedom.5 3 Even Hudgins' lawyer, Edmund Randolph,
conceded that that the Wrights looked white.5 4 The Hudgins court, how-
ever, acknowledged the fluidity of race; one's race was not necessarily
dictated by one's ancestry or fractions of "blood."'' 5 Yet, in separate con-
curring opinions, both Judges Roane and Tucker attempted to make sense
of the Hudgins' white physical appearance. Thereby, both judges endeav-
ored to erect impermeable racial boundaries between Black and white
purely on the basis of physical appearance and its presumed manifesta-
tions.
According to Judge Tucker, a person with "pure" or of equal degrees
of African ancestry will display the "characteristic marks that Nature has
stampt [sic] on the African and his descendants" even when the darker
skin color "disappears or becomes doubtful": "a flat nose and woolly head
of hair.,1 6 Similarly, Judge Tucker explained that the "jet black lank hair"
characteristic of the Native American perpetuated despite miscegena-
tion. 7 Judge Tucker avowed an intransience of race as well as a clear
demarcation between races based on a presumed persistence of racialized
physical traits. Judge Roane, however, did not expressly affirm the perpe-
straightness of their hair but the exercise of their non-black identity and their recognition
as non-black by neighboring whites").
152. Sharfstein, supra note 123, at 622.
153. "The women, through attorney George K. Taylor, stressed the most commonly
used proxies for race--skin color and outward appearance-to establish their claim to
freedom ... [i]mportantly, Taylor asked, 'what more than strong characteristic features
would be required to prove a person white?' "). Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 147, at 156
(quoting Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 135). Taylor even propounded to the court
"[t]his is not a common case of mere blacks suing for their freedom; but of persons per-
fectly white." Id.
154. Randolph's concession was restricted to the notion that the Wrights were inci-
dentally phenotypically white and not "biologically" white. Specifically, he asserted that
"[t]he circumstance of appellees' being white, has been mentioned, more to excite the
feelings of the Court as men, than to address them asJudges."). Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. &
M.) at 136.
155. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nine-
teenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 141-42 (1998) (opining that in early nineteenth
century racial determination cases like Hudgins,"the fluidity that characterized these cases
results from the greater permeability of the border between Indian and white, the confla-
tion of'race' and 'nation' in the definition of'Indian' and the lesser stigma attached to the
Indian "race" by whites").
156. Hudgins, 11Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 139-40.
157. Id. at 139.
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tuity of racialized physical traits. Rather, he asserted that when interracial
unions between Native Americans, whites and Africans occur, "it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to say from inspection only, which race
predominates in the offspring, and certainly impossible to determine
whether the descent from a given race has been through the paternal or
maternal line.' '58
Yet, Judge Roane also consented to the ideal that race was perma-
nent by likewise sanctioning the prototypical and stereotypical physical
constructs of Blackness, whiteness, and Indianness proffered by Judge
Tucker: Blacks of pure and mixed African ancestry possessed "a flat nose
and woolly hair"; Native Americans were "copper coloured with long
jetty black, straight hair"; and whites exhibited "a fair complexion, brown
hair not woolly or inclining thereto, with a prominent Roman nose.,19
Appropriating these racial constructs, Judge Roane concurred with as-
signing a heightened burden of proof in freedom suits to claimants who
appeared Black:
in the case of a person visibly appearing to be a Negro, the
presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is in-
cumbent on him to make out his right to freedom; but in the
case of a person visibly appearing to be a white man, or an In-
dian, the presumption is that he is free, and it is necessary for
his adversary to shew [sic] that he is a slave. 6 °
Significantly, centuries ago in Hudgins, Judges Roane and Tucker ar-
ticulated not only the physical contours of a person of African, Native
American, or white ancestry but also the actual and perceived status of an
individual who bore the attendant physical markers, which predominates
in subsequent cases of racial determination and current instances of de-
termining race in American society. As the early nineteenth century
justices elucidated, despite the known fluidity and convergence of racial
boundaries, a permanent, fixed binary system of race and status can co-
exist. Dark skin color, a large nose, "kinky" or "woolly" hair continuously
signifies Blackness and the most subordinated status. Similarly, fair skin,
straight hair, and a Roman nose has consistently symbolized the socially
constructed polar opposite of Blackness-whiteness-the most privileged
status.
Forty years after the Hudgins case, South Carolina justices conveyed
American truisms of racial determination in White v. Tax Collector of Ker-
shaw District1 61 . First, the court declared that status equates to race and vice
versa: the question of whether "persons alleged to be colored and
158. Id. at 141.
159. Id. at 140.
160. Id. at 141.
161. 1846 WL 2283, at *1 (S.C. App. L. 1846).
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claiming to be white [is a] case relating to the status of [such] persons."
Secondly, the court rejected the one-drop rule and any other mechanical
"blood" rule affixed to determining one's race. White, like Hudgins, is an
"antebellum case of racial determination [which] continued to contain a
reality of racial migration within rhetoric affirming the certainty of racial
difference."' 62 The White court, too, declared that Blackness manifested
itself physically and was visibly detectable: "if the color and other charac-
teristics of African descent be distinctly marked and obvious, the
condition of the person is determined by inspection only."'
63
Simultaneously, the White court undermined the intransience of
Blackness by contending that people even with the same proportions of
mixed African and non-African descent "may present such different com-
plexions and features" 164 could be assigned to different racial castes.
65
Therefore, physical characteristics were "a very uncertain criterion of
caste."' 6 6 Nevertheless, the court insisted on maintaining the rhetoric of
racial distinctiveness when physical appearance failed to "accurately" as-
sign one's race. According to the court, an individual's whiteness or non-
whiteness could be determined by an individual's behavior: "[h]abit and
education have so strongly associated with the European race the enjoy-
ment of all the rights and immunities of freedom, that color alone is felt
and recognized as a claim."'6 7 Thus, White v. Tax Collector aptly illustrates
Professor Ian Haney Lopez's poignant observation that "the legal con-
struction of race pushes in many different directions on a multitude of
levels, sometimes along mutually reinforcing lines but more often along
divergent vectors, occasionally entrenching existing notions of race but
also at other times or even simultaneously fabricating new conceptions of
racial difference.',
68
Moreover, the White court held that the issue of determining an
"ambiguous" person's race-"where color and features are doubtful-
must partake more of a political than legal character, and in great degree,be decided by public opinion, expressed in the verdict of a jury, ,169i.e.,
the determination of race is not based solely on requisite amounts of"ne-
gro blood," rather it is socially-mediated. In so holding, the court
implicitly affirmed three central principles concerning "blood rules". In
large part, blood rules were created in isolation of the community con-
sensus on what characteristics define whiteness or non-whiteness.
162. Sharfstein, supra note 123, at 626.
163. White, 1846 WL 2283, at *2.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. IAN F HANEY LopEz, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 115
(1996).
169. White, 1846 WL 2283, at *2.
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Secondly, they were enacted and applied to determine the race of an indi-
vidual who did not unequivocally comport with the physical
characteristics attributed to Blackness. Thirdly, the application of blood
rules was not the primary method used by arbiters to determine an indi-
vidual's race.
The court also affirmed yet another important concept illuminated
through racial determination cases: race is contextual, subjective, malle-
able, and manipulable. Accordingly, the White court fortified the view that
U.S. courts throughout history when determining an individual's race
"were not absolutist about blood purity, regularly turning to other criteria
in drawing the color line.0 70 The additional criteria that the South Caro-
lina court invoked to ascertain whether the ambiguous looking person
could be conferred membership into the white race and its associated
privileges was an assessment of his "reputation, reception in society, and
exercise of the privileges of a white man., 17 1 The inclusion of "reputation
or performance evidence" was first adopted by the South Carolina judici-
172
ary in 1831 in State v. Hanna
According to Professor Ariela Gross in her groundbreaking law re-
view article on racial determination cases, "Litigating Whiteness: Trials of
Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South ' 173 "reputation
or performance evidence" was widely accepted throughout the South
during the nineteenth century. 174 Professor Gross explains the performa-
tive and legal aspects of race which gained increased importance in the
southern United States during the mid-nineteenth century:
To be white was to act white: to associate with whites, to
dance gracefully, to vote. Blood may have been the signified,
but the signifiers were social acts. More than that, the signifiers
of race were not only social and political but also prescriptive
and legal. [To be a white man] meant to be a citizen, a civic
being, someone who could do certain kinds of things ...
[J]udges gave. greater weight to particular kinds of racial per-
formance. At the appellate level, when courts referred to
performances of whiteness, it was civic performances theyfoun • .175
found deterrmnative.
Indeed, the appellate court in White assessed the evidence presented
at trial demonstrating whether Elijah Bass had ever exercised "rights of
citizenship", i.e., rights of whiteness in order to affirm or reject the jury's
170. Sharfstein, supra note 123, at 598.
171. White, 1846 WL 2283, at *2.
172. State v. Hanna, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.)558 (S.C.App. 1831).
173. Gross, supra note 155.
174. Id. passim.
175. Id. at 162-64.
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decision that Elijah Bass and his children, the relators in the action, were
not white and were therefore rightfully subjected to the capitation tax
free negroes, mulattoes, and mustizos'76 were required to pay In support
of their claim to whiteness, the Bass children offered numerous grounds.
They asserted that they were educated as free white persons with other
white neighborhood children; the entire family associated with whites as
whites and demonstrated good character; and their father owned property
and slaves.' 78 A former tax collector even attested that Elijah Bass had
never paid the capitation tax imposed on free Negroes, mulattoes and
mustizoes. 79 Additionally, two of the three children had white spouses.1
8
0
The court ruled that the evidence the Bass children presented was
insufficient to position their father "among the constitutional freeman of
the State" 8' and thereby deem them "sufficiently white" to grant a new
trial. Even though there was no knowledge that the children had been
denied the rights and privileges of a free white person, 18 2 the court based
its ruling on the fact that their father, "Elijah Bass[, never] exercised, or
claimed to exercise, the rights of citizenship in any particular' 83 Fur-
thermore, according to the court, the children's allegations concerning
"respectability would give as good a claim to [whiteness] to a large num-
ber of mulattoes; ... [however,] marriage with a white person has never
been held to elevate a colored person into the class of citizens; nor has
mere social intercourse.'
184
It appears that the court was attempting to enforce a rigid yet inde-
cipherable distinction between social whiteness-exercising the social
privileges of whites, e.g., marrying a white person, attending white
schools and churches, residing in white neighborhoods-and racial/legal
whiteness-exercising the civic duties of a white man, e.g., voting, hold-
ing political office, testifying in a court of law. Significantly, it was alleged
that Elijah Bass served as a witness in a lawsuit "in which free white per-
sons were parties."88 Upon closer examination, it also seems as if the
court's refusal to acknowledge the Bass's potential whiteness was influ-
176. South Carolina defined a mustizo as a person of Indian and European descent.
William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 CaRbozo
L. REV. 1711, 1781 n.291 (1996).
177. Friends of the Bass children brought the original action on their behalf and
sought a new trial from the Court of Appeals of Law of South Carolina. See generally
White, 1846WL 2283, at *1-3.
178. Id. at *1-2.
179. Id. at *1.
180. See generally id. at *1-3.
181. Id. at *3.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Id. at *3.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *1.
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enced by two equally important factors: the physical appearance of Elijah
Bass and his daughter, Martha White, and the overarching socio-political
(and quite possibly the judge's personal' 6) objective in precluding "par-
ticipation in the rights of citizenship by any who bear in their persons the
traces of their servile origin.'
18 7
The court was not seeking to erect a strict demarcation between
whiteness and Blackness per se. Rather, the court sought to create a clear
boundary between whiteness and non-whiteness. Notably, in the opening
sentences of the majority opinion, the court outlined the three distinct
classes of people in South Carohna-citizens, i.e., whites, slaves, and mu-
lattoes and mustizoes-and recognized interracial unions, the
permeability of racial distinctions and the problems miscegenation caused
for unsuspecting whites. The court proclaimed, "the constant tendency of
[mulattoes] to assimilate to white, and the desire of elevation, present fre-
quent cases of embarrassment and difficulty."' 8
It appears that the court's objective in affirming the jury's decision
was to preserve the intermediate class allotted for mulattoes as well as to
ensure that mulattoes would not be able to elevate to whiteness, especially
for those mulattoes whose physical appearances evidenced Blackness. The
court noted that the skin color of Elijah Bass and his daughter, Martha
White, denoted their African ancestry.'89 The presiding trial judge stated
the following in his report:
Elijah Bass was in court. He was a dark quadroon, if he was
one; from his color he appeared to be a mulatto. Their mother
was in court. She was a white woman .... Mrs. White [Elijah
Bass' daughter] shewed [sic] plainly the corrupt blood. Her
brother, William Bass, to my eye, appeared an ordinary white
sand hill boy... Martha was married to a white man, a
Scotchman. Her child, at the breast, was a fair, blue-eyed child;
no one (not knowing its mother,) would say that it had any
admixture of African blood.'9
Based on the trial judge's report and their observations of the Bass
family, the majority of the judges presiding over the appeal for a new trial
sustained the jury's decision that Elijah Bass and his children were not
white.' 9' Pursuant to the court's ruling, the Bass children were required to
186. Judge Frost wrote the majority opinion with Judge Evans and Judge Wardlaw
concurring. HoweverJudge Frost's ruling was not a unanimous decision.Judge Butler was
absent from the proceedings. Id. at *3. Judges Richardson and O'Neall dissented, simply
stating that a new trial should have been granted. Id.
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *1,3.
190. Id. at *1.
191. Id. at *3.
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pay the capitation tax from which whites were exclusively exempted and
from which the family was previously immune.
The case of the Bass family brilliantly unveils the fluidity of race. For
at least two generations, the Bass' were considered white within their
community despite their known mixed heritage. And, for at least twenty-
five years, Elijah Bass did not have to pay a capitation tax. '9 Yet, the tax
collector who in all likelihood was a white person did not perceive the
Bass children as white when he surveyed the neighborhood and poten-
tially other whites in the neighborhood. Thus, the tax collector's (and the
judges') individual determinations illustrate that one's race is not natural,
objective, and fixed; it is quite contextual, relational, and subjective-one's
race, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Likewise, the fact that the
court openly acknowledged the Bass' "social whiteness" but determined
that the absence of certain behaviors disqualified them from "racial/legal
whiteness" further substantiates the contextual, subjective and malleable
nature of race; for, in the eyes of the law, the Bass' were not racially fit to
acquire the privileges of whiteness yet in the eyes of society, the Bass' suf-
ficiently displayed their "whiteness".
It is also important to note Elijah Bass' grandchildren were not rele-
gated to the same racial disability as their parents and grandfather.
Without any assessment of their "reputation, reception in society, or exer-
cise of the privileges reserved for white [men]," the appellate court upheld
the jury's decision that "the grandchildren of Elijah Bass, the children
[conceived by] one of his sons with a white woman, were white.' 193 In
fact, the court found "no inconsistency between the verdict in this case,
and that which found the grandchildren of Elijah Bass ... to be white
persons." 194 Thus, White v. Tax Collector depicts another important truism of
racial determination cases: arbiters do not only manipulate judicial crite-
rion for determining race, but they also simply abandon established
principles to achieve a desired outcome. In many cases, as seen in the next
case discussion of In Re Cruz,' s the objective is to reify the fiction of ra-
cial purity and to maintain white superiority and privilege.
B. Racial Determination in the Early Twentieth Century: In Re Cruz
In 1790, Congress enacted the first naturalization statute that re-
served naturalized citizenship for "free White persons."' 9 6 Congress
192. See generally id. Mr. Shannon, a tax collector, testified that from 1819 to 1827
during his employ, Elijah Bass did not pay a capitation tax to him or to his predecessors or
successors until some point in the 1840s.
193. Id. at *3. Interestingly, the trial record did not indicate that Martha White's child
was also deemed white. See id.
194. Id.
195. In re Cruz, 23 F Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y 1938).
196. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
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amended the statute in 1870, extending the right to "aliens of African
nativity and to persons of African descent. 1 97 Whites and Blacks, therefore,
were the only racial groups permitted to become naturalized citizens. The
determination of race was a prerequisite to becoming a naturalized citi-
zen 198 and U.S. federal judges were subsequently responsible for deciding
this important legal issue. In 1936, the federal court in the Eastern District
of New York was charged with this duty in In Re Cruz, a naturalization
case, or what Professor Ian Haney Lopez refers to as a "prerequisite
case"1 99. Of the fifty-two reported prerequisite cases, Cruz is the only case
in which a petitioner alleged African ancestry to become a naturalized
citizen:2° Consequently, this is the only reported prerequisite case where a
court had to determine an individual's Blackness.
The petitioner, Bernedito Cruz, claimed that he possessed one-
fourth African ancestry and three-fourths Native American ancestry201
The court enumerated various "blood statutes" enacted throughout the
country by the beginning of the twentieth century. The court's survey
depicted a broad range of proportions of African ancestry which allegedly
denominated an individual Black: one fourth, one-eighth, one-third, and
less than one-fourth.20 2 The court declined to follow any of these legisla-
tive constructs, but nonetheless adopted an equally arbitrary standard of
defining Blackness. The court further cited to other rulings that held that
an individual of one-fourth white ancestry and three-fourths Native
American ancestry could not be admitted to citizenship as a white per-
son. 203 Likewise, the court decided that Bernedito Cruz, being one-fourth
African, could not be admitted to the United States citizenry as a Black
204person.
Interestingly, when the federal court denied Bernedito Cruz's peti-
tion, the racial ideology of the "one-drop" rule had reverberated
throughout the nation for well over one hundred years and had recently
become codified in Virginia and Georgia. However, the court did not ap-
ply the rule of hypodescent in deciding this case, as would be expected by
scholars (and members of the general public) who proclaim that in the
United States-the presence of one African ancestor-determines one's
197. Act ofJuly 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (repealed 1952).
198. It is important to note that in 1857, the United States Supreme Court decided
race was a general prerequisite to American citizenship. See Dred Scot v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
393 (1857). The Court held that Blacks were not citizens of the United States and there-
fore unable to exercise the rights and privileges guaranteed under the Constitution. Id. at
404-05.
199. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 168,passim.
200. See generally id.
201. In re Cruz, 23 E Supp. 774 (1938).
202. Id. at 775.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Blackness. In light of this case's socio-historical context, the court's rejec-
tion of the one-drop rule and its simultaneous manipulation of racial
determination norms illustrate a well-established pattern of courts in ra-
cial determination cases: to preserve the fiction of white racial purity and
in this particular instance, the attendant privilege of citizenship.
By the time the Cruz litigation surfaced, nativist thought was ram-
pant throughout the United States. Anti-Asian forces were at large on the
West Coast. 201 Jim Crow was the law throughout the southern United
States and racial stratification in education, employment and housing were
the norm in the North. Indeed, the emergence of social Darwinism at the
beginning of the twentieth century "helped to strengthen the emerging
Jim Crow order in the South and elsewhere in the nation. , 206 "Many ad-
herents of social Darwinism saw Afro-Americans (and people of color
generally) as an inferior people destined to perish in the competition be-
tween the races., 20 7 Despite the scientific community's shift away from
such theories in the 1920s and 1930s, racism still had strong support in
mainstream culture." 8 White North Americans still wished to "[maintain]
a white majority and preserve the racial purity of the U.S. white popula-
tion. 20 9
The law also facilitated the propagation of popular racist sentiment
and the enactment and enforcement of U.S. immigration policies fol-
lowed suit. In 1924, Congress established the National Origins Act, which
significantly restricted immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe,
"hop[ing] to prevent 'Dirty Europeans' from polluting the nation's Anglo-
Saxon heritage."21 In similar spirit, the court in Cruz, like preceding and
subsequent courts, did not appropriate the widely espoused one-drop rule
in determining the petitioner's Blackness to ensure that only whites and
"assimilable" groups be conferred U.S. citizenship. The rule of hypo-
descent, again, is shown to be merely a racial ideology and not a rule
applied in actual instances of racial determination.
The court's repudiation of the one-drop rule was commonplace in
cases of racial determination; however, a closer examination of In Re Cruz
evinces that the court took extraordinary steps to maintain white racial
purity and privilege. The court formulated its own determination norm
rather than adopt the legislative constructs enacted at the time. By the
1930s, local and state legislatures throughout the United States had sig-
nificantly restricted the amount of African ancestry one could possess to
205. See generally Eric K.Yamamoto et al., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPAR ATON: LAW AND
THEJAPANESE INTERNMENT 32-35 (Aspen Publishers 2001).
206. ROBERT COTrROL, et al., BROWN V. BoARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND
THE CONSTIUTION 37 (University Press of Kansas, 2003).
207. Id. at 38.
208. Id. at 87.
209. Cottrol, supra note 11, at 65.
210. ROBINSON, supra note 122, at 103.
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be considered not only what we contemporarily deem white but also
non-white-Native American, Mexican, and Spanish. For example, Okla-
homa legally classified Native Americans as whites, Arizona classified
Mexicans as whites, and both states passed anti-miscegenation laws.21 ,
Thus, legislators made a concerted effort to ensure persons with an infini-
tesimal amount of African "blood" could only claim Blackness.
Consequently, to maintain the semblance that American citizenship was
exclusively reserved for whites, the court in Cruz had to significantly de-
part from not only the prevailing legislative trend of determining
Blackness, but more importantly judicial norms of determining Blackness.
The court held the following:
in order for a petitioner to qualify [for naturalized citizenship
under the statute], his African descent must be shown to be at
least an affirmative quantity, and not a neutral thing as in the
case of the half blood, or a negative one as in the case of the
one-quarter blood.2
The court rationalized its holding based on a comparison of other
naturalization cases in which petitioners claimed one-fourth white ances-
213try and were not deemed white by the courts. As a result, the
petitioners were disqualified from becoming naturalized citizens. There-
fore, under the pretense of "equity" the court promulgated a parallel
standard for Bernedito Cruz: he, too, could not qualify for citizenship on
the same amount of African ancestry.
Moreover, the In re Cruz court articulated a more stringent racial
qualification for those seeking naturalized citizenship on the presence of
African ancestry. Petitioners had to demonstrate an "affirmative quantity"
of African ancestry-more than half of their traceable ancestors had to be
of African descent. It is apparent that the court formulated this standard to
solidify the physical construct of whiteness and prototypical image of an
American without expressly stating its rejection of the petitioner's claim
for citizenship was in part based on physical prerequisites. In 1936, the
court's incorporation of a "comparative method" and the invocation of a
"blood" construct that increased the requisite African ancestry to ascertain
an individual's Blackness were anomalies for racial determination cases.
211. See id. at 109-110.
212. In re Cruz, 23 E Supp. at 775.
213. Id.
214. Unlike other racial determination contexts, in prerequisite cases courts did not
expressly adopt physical appearance as a factor in determining whiteness. See, e.g., Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (rejecting the petitioner's claim that his skin color
qualified him as white, and thus rejecting the color test as a method of determining an
individual's "whiteness"). However, it is highly improbable that courts deciding prerequi-
site cases did not consider a petitioner's physical appearance when issuing a ruling on the
petitioner's "whiteness" or "non-whiteness."
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Yet, the creation and reconfiguration of racial determination methods to
assist the reification of white racial purity, privilege and superiority were
quite the norm. In Re Cruz further demonstrates the mutability and sub-
jectivity of race. At one given moment, an individual could be "Black"
and thus barred from marrying a white person, yet not "Black" and pre-
cluded from naturalized citizenship.
C. Moving Toward a New Millennium Yet Mired in the Past:
The Malone and Perkins Cases
Affirmative action and employment discrimination are modern con-
texts in which U.S. courts determine an individual's race as a decisive
issue. Interestingly, the methods U.S.jurists presently employ are standards
promulgated centuries ago. Thereby, a historical overview of racial deter-
mination cases demonstrates that notions of race are not trapped in
history, ensconced in a particular place and time; they continue to be per-
petuated and accepted as existing norms. The 1994 Massachusetts case
Malone v. Civil Service Commission21 ' best demonstrates the saliency of racial
constructs beyond time and place.
In 1977, upon discovering the existence of a Black great-
grandmother, twin brothers stated on their employment applications with
216the Boston Fire Department that they were Black. Previously in 1975,
the Malone brothers submitted applications with the fire department--on
which they stated they were white-and had been denied employment. 21 7
After the fire department became subject to a court decree mandating
increased minority hiring, the brothers allegedly became aware of a Black
ancestor. Consequently, the brothers claimed they were Black on their
second employment application. Their assertion proved to be successful.
They were subsequently hired by the fire department and worked with
the department for over twelve years. However, the brothers' success
ended.
In 1988, while in the process of reviewing promotion lists, the Bos-
ton Fire Commissioner discovered the brothers were identified as Black.2 8
This finding surprised the Commissioner because he thought the brothers
were white.2' 9 An investigation to uncover the veracity of the Malones'
215. 646 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
216. See TsemingYang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing
Race in Affirmative Action, The Census, and A Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 367,
387-400 (2006), for an in-depth discussion of the Malone litigation.
217. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 151 n.3.
218. Yang, supra note 216, at 388.
219. See id.
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alleged racial identity and an administrative hearing ensued °2 0 The hear-
ing officer found that the brothers had willfully and falsely claimed they
were Black in order to benefit from the affirmative action program and
were terminated.221
During the administrative hearing, the Malones were allowed to re-
but their "allegedly false race designation either by 1) showing that they
had "acted in good faith," or 2) demonstrating that they were in fact
"Black".222 The Malones attempted to prove their "Blackness". To deter-
mine the Malones' requisite "Blackness," the hearing officer employed the
exact three-prong test that judges first appropriated in nineteenth century
racial determination cases like White v. Tax Collector "1) visual observation
of physical features; 2) documentary evidence establishing black ancestry,
such as birth certificates; and 3) evidence that the Malones or their fami-
lies held themselves out to be black and are considered black in the
community.
'2 23
Regarding the first prong of the racial determination test, the officer
stated, "I visually observed the Malone brothers at the hearing. They each
appear to me to have fair skin and fair hair coloring, to have Caucasian
facial features. Based on my visual observation, they do not appear to be
black.' 224 Therefore, the brothers did not satisfy the initial criteria to prove
their race. The brothers attempted to satisfy the second prong and simply
brought forth no evidence to fulfill the third prong. They offered birth
certificates for three generations, which all affirmed white racial identity,
and an inconclusive photograph of a woman they asserted was their Black
maternal grandmother.22 Based on this evidence, the hearing officer con-
cluded that the Malone brothers were not Black and reviewing courts
upheld the officer's finding.226
The Malone case triggers important questions concerning the weight
of the three criteria used in determining the brothers' race. If the
Malones' great grandmother could have been "conclusively" identified as
Black based on physical characteristics historically and contemporarily
associated with Blackness, would the brothers be considered Black based
on the presence of one Black ancestor despite a prototypical/stereotypical
white physical appearance? Would the brothers have to be socially ac-
cepted as Black as well? To be determined Black did the Malones simply
have to exhibit physical characteristics associated with Blackness, despite
220. The commissioner informed the personnel administrator he had reason to be-
lieve that the brothers falsely claimed minority status on their application to be appointed
to the fire department. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 151.
221. Id.
222. Yang, supra note 216, at 388.
223. Malone, 646 NE. 2d at 151 n. 4.
224. Id. at 389.
225. Malone, 646 N.E.2d at 152 n.5.
226. Id. at 151-52.
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family members' birth certificates affirming white racial identity? Or,
would the weight of the criteria depend on the context in which racial
identity is asserted or defended?
In accordance with historical and contemporary racial determina-
tion cases, the hearing examiner in the Malone case employed the three-
prong test where the race of an "ambiguous" individual was to be deter-
mined. Therefore, in all likelihood, if the brothers visibly appeared Black
to the hearing examiner, then the additional prongs-community recog-
nition and ancestral evidence-would not have been applied.
Perkins v. Lake County Dep't of Utils. 227 validates the controlling na-
ture of phenotype when whiteness and Blackness are being assessed. In
Perkins, the plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis
of race and national origin 28 in violation of Title VII. 229 The central issues
before the Perkins court were whether national origin and race were syn-
onymous and whether a Native American claiming discrimination had to
present infallible ancestral, social reputation or performance evidence to
prove he or she was Native American. 230 The court decided that the Na-
tive American plaintiff was not required to offer such evidence to prove
231
ancestry or race.
The court proclaimed that defining race in the United States has
been "ill-defined," "subjective," and "arbitrary". 23 2 Yet, "when racial dis-
crimination is involved[,] perception and appearance are everything., 233
Thus, the court regarded race as a stable, superficial physical construct and
in fact, appropriated notions of Blackness to support its proposition and
ultimate ruling. According to the court, evidence of an African American's
ancestry or "blood" is not needed to determine who is African American:
227. 860 E Supp. 1262, 1266 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
228. Mr. Perkins claimed race discrimination in his complaint. Id. at 1264. The Per-
kins court also treated Perkins' claim as a national origin claim. Id. at 1266.The court used
national origin and race interchangeably throughout the opinion. See id.
229. Id. at 1266.
230. See id. at 1272-77 Significantly, the Perkins court expressly denounced the ap-
propriation of the one-drop rule to determine whether an individual is Black. Id. at 1271.
231. The court specifically held "the fact of [Mr. Perkins'] and his employer's belief in
his status as an American Indian, added to which is his apparent physical resemblance to
Native Americans and his family's belief in and propagation of his Indian heritage" suffi-
ciently supported Mr. Perkins'TitleVII claim of national origin discrimination. Id. at 1277.
Mr. Perkins presented evidence of his "American Indian appearance" through the deposi-
tion testimony of Melton Fletcher, "the program coordinator for the North American
Indian Cultural Center." Id. at 1269. The court acknowledged "as to Plaintiff's personal
appearance ... there was no doubt in [Fletcher's] mind that Plaintiff is a Native American."
In fact, Fletcher testified "[Perkins] appeared to look like an Indian to me. He certainly-
I've been around a lot of native people, and him walking in my door, I-it would be very
hard for me to mistake him for anything else" because of his facial characteristics and
complexion. Id. at 1270.
232. Id. at 1271.
233. Id. at 1277.
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African Americans do not have to demonstrate that their rela-
tives lived in Africa, or that they visit the site of their roots, or
that they are involved in any kind of cultural activities associ-
ated with Africa. They only have to appear to be African
Americans to be deemed members of the protected class.3
Furthermore, the court noted that African Americans were "more
readily identifiable minorities ... [therefore,] it is difficult to imagine an
employer challenging an employee's status as an African American and
requiring proof of ancestry in a Title VII case in which a black Plaintiff
alleged employment discrimination.' 23 5 In doing so, the Perkins court
adopted the comparative and subjective socially derived image of Black-
ness expressed in Hudgins v. Wright centuries prior: Blacks exhibit a dark
skin tone, a flat nose and woolly hair, and individuals who did not exhibit
the required skin color can still be deemed Black based on a combination
of other physical features that signify their Blackness.
Despite the bias and inconsistency of assigning physical characteris-
tics to race and thereby determining race, the consistency as to which
outward appearances designate Blackness, whiteness, and otherness are
entrenched into our social and legal constructions of race. Consequently,
the Perkins court pronounced a rule of racial determination which encap-
sulates this understanding. Even if the plaintiff does not expressly identify
as a particular race, the individual is entitled to Title VII protection if the
employer believed that the plaintiff was a member of protected class based
on some objective evidence, which "may consist of physical appearance,
language, cultural activities, or associations. 36 Hence, like early racial de-
termination cases, Malone and Perkins expose the canons of U.S. racial
determination jurisprudence: courts' application of racial determination
methods evinces both the paradoxical nature of race-objective and con-
stant yet fluid, subjective, and contextual-and the inapplicability of the
hypodescent rule.
Ill.THE APPLICATION OF U.S. RACIAL DETERMINATION METHODS
TO THE BRAZILIAN CASE
Like other scholars, Carl Degler has opined, the "amazing array of
terms and gradations is testimony to the Brazilian emphasis upon appear-
ance rather than upon genetic or racial background, which is the key to
the North American definition of the Negro.' 23 In his Note, "Not as Easy
as Black and White: The Implications of the University of Rio de Janeiro's
234. Id. at 1276.
235. Id. at 1278 n.20.
236. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278.
237. DEGLER, supra note 14, at 103. See also Piza and Rosemberg, supra note 5.
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Quota-Based Admissions on Affirmative Ation Law in Brazil," Ricardo
Rochetti similarly argues that unlike the United States, Brazil's view of
race "does not appear to subscribe to any type of genetic-based racial clas-
sification that relies on descent.""23 Instead, there appears to exist within
Brazilian society a much more "fluid" concept of racial classification than
in U.S. society.239 Therefore, according to Rochetti "[b]ecause of Brazil's
'color-based' notions of racial classification, governmental, educational,
and business entities will be unable to sustain affirmative action schemes
predicated on race [like those implemented in the United States] .
To say that in Brazil race is fluid and that race only constitutes skin
color and not ancestry and that Blackness in the United States is static as
it is solely defined by the presence of one Black ancestor are overly sim-
plistic claims. The infinite gradations of color that presumably define an
individual's race in Brazil indeed take into account one's ancestry; the
myriad racial labels demarcate the various physical characteristics an indi-
vidual exhibits which have been and continue to be linked to Black
and/or white ancestry. Furthermore, a closer examination of race in Brazil
and the United States reveals that conceptualizations of mobility and ri-
gidity are components of both nations' systems of racial categorization.
Professor Tanya Hernandez advances a thoughtful explication on the
commonality of race in the Americas:
Latin American racial distinctions, which are visually based on
phenotype, have been described as a "prejudice of mark" be-
cause they seem to focus on physical appearances rather than
origins. This descriptor stands in supposed contrast to the U.S.
model, known as a "prejudice of origin" which makes racial
distinctions based chiefly on heritage or ancestry.Yet, in opera-
tion, the prejudice-of-mark's use of phenotype effectively
incorporates ancestry into the process or act of racialization,
both formally and informally. Similarly, ... a prejudice-of-
origin approach to racial distinctions pragmatically incorpo-
rates observations of phenotype into considerations of
ancestry ... The Latin American model is promoted as flexible
and therefore less focused on maintaining rigid racial distinc-
tions, whereas the U.S. model is promoted as static and
therefore reliable in its consistency. But in practice, the rigidity
built into "fluid" Latin American visual assessments, and the
238. Rochetti, supra note 10, at 1460 (discussing the inefficacy of U.S. style race-
conscious affirmative action programs because of Brazil's more fluid racial classification
system).
239. Id. at 1461.
240. Rochetti, supra note 10, at 1461; see, e.g., Racusen, supra note 10, at 793 (arguing
that "Brazilians identify in many different categories that connote color and appearance
rather than race and origin").
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imprecise and thus necessarily fluid visual assessments that
form a part of the rigid traditional U.S. model, both mix and
deploy the politics of fluidity and rigidity to maintain a hierar-
chical preference for Whiteness in both places.4
Despite both nations' fluidity in determining race, a fixed construc-
tion of Blackness and whiteness exists. Currently, in Brazil and the United
States the instant determination of who is Black and who is white is
largely based on similar racial constructs articulated almost three centuries
ago in Hudgins v. White: dark skin, woolly or "kinky" hair 2 2 , and a broad
nose signify Blackness or a predominance of African ancestors; fair skin,
Roman nose, and straight hair signify whiteness or a heightened presence
of white ancestry.
In an effort to minimize "racial fraud" and to ensure that darker
Brazilians would be the beneficiaries of the affirmative action program, in
2003 Mato Grasso du Sol, the third Brazilian state to implement affirma-
tive action in higher education, formed a Commission of Black students,
professors, and activists to verify applicants' claims that they were
afrodescendentes.243 After reviewing photographs of the applicants, the
Commission rejected 76 of the 530 applicants because they did not pos-
244
sess the requisite phenotype. According to the President of the State
Council for the Defense of Negro Rights (CEDINE), Naercio Ferreira
Fernandes de Souza, the rejected applicants did not display the Negro
Preto [the Black Negro] phenotype: "thick lips, flat nose, and frizzy
,,24 246hair. '245 According to Professor Antonio Srgio Alfredo Guimares,
whiteness in Brazil is identified as "precisely this mixture, light skin, white
241. Hernandez, supra note 38, at 1109-23.
242. Rebecca Reichmann discusses the decision of a Brazilian judge in 1996 prohib-
iting a Brazilian singer, Tiririca, from publicly performing her popular country-rock song,
"Look at Her Hair" which "berated a black woman's 'steel wool' hair, likening its smell to
a skunk." Reichmann, supra note 4, at 28. A portion of the pejorative song lyrics is as fol-
lows:
... Look, look, look at her hair
It looks like a brillo to scrub a pan
When she passes by, she gets my attention
But her hair, it's hopeless
Her stink almost made me faint ....
Telles, supra note 5, at 154.
243. Racusen, supra note 10, at 817-18.
244. Id. at 819.
245. Id.
246. Dr. Guimares is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Sbo Paulo. He
specializes in race relations in Brazil with a concentration on the construction of racial and
national identities.
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features, straight or curly hair. More often than not, these physical con-
structs rather than the knowledge of remote African or white ancestors
determine how an individual is classified and treated in both American
societies.
In an interview with Professor Guimaries, Professor S&gio
248Adorno recounts witnessing racial discrimination while shopping in a
bread store in Perdizes, a middle-class district of Sio Paulo city.249 Accord-
ing to Professor Adorno, when he arrived an older Black woman was
waiting to be served while the store attendant assisted a blond woman
from Perdizes.2 ' 0 After the attendant finished serving the white female
customer, he turned to Professor Adorno to assist him instead of the older
Black woman.25 ' Professor Adorno insisted that the woman be helped first
and the attendant retorted,"[n]o, she can wait a little. 252 Professor Adorno
surmises that the basis for the attendant's unsuccessful attempt to assist
him (Professor Adorno demanded that the woman be served before him)
was the attendant's assumption that the Black woman was a domestic
worker in the area. 2 3 He further observed that the attendant though also
Black "was being courteous to a white person at the cost of a black per-
son who was in line."
254
This instance of racial discrimination demonstrates the universality
of Blackness, as both Professor Adorno, a white Brazilian, and the store
attendant, an afrodescendente, classified this older woman as Black. At the
same time and in the same place, for both observers of different races this
woman satisfied the physiognomy of Blackness. Moreover, Professor
Adorno apparently satisfied the oppositional race/status construct of
whiteness. Thereby, for the store attendant the woman's "Blackness" justi-
fied his discriminatory and subordinating treatment toward her and
Professor Adorno's "whiteness" justified preferential and superior treat-
ment. For Professor Adorno, however, the older woman's status in the line
deserved respect regardless of his or her physical appearance. This anecdo-
tal evidence affirms that the principal method U.S. courts have applied
when determining race and Brazilians employ to determine race in social
247. INTERvIEw WITH FRIAR DAVID RAIMUNDO SANTOS in BEYOND RACISM, supra
note 5, at 538, 543. According to Dr. Guimaries, in Brazil this phenotype is called "good
appearance" or boa aparncia, which people of color in Brazil have used "to climb higher in
life and forge their path identifying themselves as whites." Id.
248. Dr. Adorno is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Cen-
ter for the Study ofViolence at the University of Sio Paulo.
249. Antonio Sergio Alfredo Guimaraes, INTERvIEw WITH StIRGIo ADORNo in BEYOND
RACISM, supra note 5, at 525, 536.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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situations-physical appearance-can also be appropriated by Brazilian
arbiters assigned the task of determining whether an individual is Afro-
Brazilian and thus a proper beneficiary of recent affirmative action pro-
grams in higher education.
Generally, when determining Blackness or whiteness, U.S. courts
have applied four precepts: 1) physical appearance; 2) ancestry; 3) com-
munity recognition; and 4) racial performance. As the previously discussed
racial determination cases demonstrate, neither ancestry nor origin has
been the sole determinant of Blackness or whiteness in the United States.
Historically and contemporarily physical appearance has served as the
primary determinant for courts determining race. In cases where physical
appearance was not "conclusive" or the individual's race was deemed
"ambiguous", courts considered additional evidence of ancestry, commu-
nity recognition or reputation, and racial performance. Accordingly,
Brazilian decision-makers, like U.S. courts, can employ the physical con-
structs associated with Blackness or non-whiteness to designate an
applicant Afro-Brazilian.
In Brazil, "Blacks (pretos or negros) in popular conceptions of the
term are those at the darkest end of the color continuum, but in an in-
creasingly used sense of the term (negro), it includes mulattoes or browns
as well. 2-' s Despite the mutability of self-classification in Brazil, "one's ap-
pearance constrains millions of Brazilians to being black ... [as] [t]here is
virtually no ambiguity when making distinctions between white and
black (preto) or in many cases but far from most cases, between white and
brown. 256 Indeed, individuals whose physical appearances connote to
others preto, negro, pardo and even mulatto are more likely to encounter
similar stigmatization and marginalization. 7 Therefore, applicants who fit
the socially constructed and accepted phenotype of a preto, negro, mulatto
or pardo could justifiably be deemed Afro-Brazilian for affirmative action
purposes.
In post-slavery Brazil, "[t]he uppermost levels of society continued
to be overwhelmingly European Brazilian ... [and] [t]he lowest levels re-
mained overwhelmingly African Brazilian and disproportionately black."2 "
255. TELLES, supra note 5, at 218.
256. Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
257. According to Telles, "mulattos or morenos are valued as the quintessential Brazil-
ians in national beliefs, although they are often marginalized in reality and are much more
similar to Blacks than whites in the Brazilian class structure." Telles, supra note 5, at 218.
Due to structural racial inequality and racism, mulattos, morenos, and negros constitute
half of the poverty stricken population in Brazil, the majority of the working class and a
minority of a small middle class population. See id. at 220. Therefore, I submit that lighter
skinned Afro-Brazilians should also be deemed proper beneficiaries of affirmative action.
258. DANIEL, supra note 16, at 40. See also Nascimento and Nascimento, supra note 9,
at 108 (describing the darker complexions of poverty and disenfranchisement in Brazil).
The Nascimentos contend
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In contemporary Brazilian society, it is a factual observation "that the
complexion offavelados (shantytown dwellers) is darker than that of those
who live in upper-income neighborhoods and that few Afro-Brazilians
can be found on university campuses. '259 Edward E. Telles confirms this
personal reflection:
Although hidden behind the facade of miscegenation, [in Bra-
zil] a racist culture is ubiquitous in all social interactions
among whites, browns, and blacks in virtually all social situa-
tions. It is based on a web of beliefs and subordinate positions
that are the proper place for browns and blacks and that social
spaces that involve control and access to resources should be
occupied by whites. From vertical relations like hiring and
promotions to horizontal ones like hanging out with friends
or enduring the dating market, slights against blacks and
browns accrue to the many other slights that preceded them,
often harming the self-esteem of brown and especially black
persons. Such treatment intensifies with each successively
darker shade of skin color.60
Hence, by the time both countries abolished slavery-the United
States in 1865 and Brazil in 1888-common racial constructs and racial
hierarchy had become deeply entrenched into each nation's fabric. These
racial constructs and corresponding racial hierarchy shaped conceptions of
Blackness and whiteness long after slavery's demise, and continue to do so
even currently. Accordingly, like U.S. courts, Brazilian arbiters can employ
the primary method of determining Blackness when ascertaining the
proper beneficiary of affirmative action in higher education: classification
on the basis of physical appearance.
In the case of the "ambiguous" applicant, Brazilian arbiters can also
consider evidence of ancestry and/or community reputation. Even
though it is a more common phenomenon in Brazil than in the United
[r]acial hierarchy and segregation are etched indelibly in contrasting land-
scapes of luxury and privation ... African Brazilians in disproportionate
numbers live in urban shantytowns called favelas, mocambos, or palafitas. To
visit Rio de Janeiro's Central Station [the train and bus station for the Rio
de Janeiro's metropolitan area] is to witness dangerously dilapidated trains
taking hours to transport mostly black workers from the huge metropolitan
area called the Baixada Fluminense to their jobs in the capital city ... [t]he
racial contrast between a public school in Baixada-or poor suburbs or
favelas almost anywhere in Brazil-and a university in a rich area like Rio de
Janeiro's Zona Sul is [Black and white].
Id.
259. David J. Hellwig, Introduction: The Myth of the Racial Paradise, in AacuCAN AMERI-
CAN REFLECTIONS ON BRAzILS'S RACIAL PARADISE 6 (David J. Hellwig, ed., 2006).
260. TELLES, supra note 5, at 222.
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States for children to be racially classified differently than their parents
and for siblings who have the same parents to not share the same racial
classification, ancestral evidence can still be used to determine an appli-
cant's race. If the applicant's parents have declared themselves negro, preto,
mulatto, or pardo, then the ambiguous applicant can also be classified as one
of these categories. Like in the case of the Malone brothers, evidence of a
remote African ancestor would be insufficient to support a determination
of Blackness. A rule of this sort could preclude potential meritless claims
of many Brazilians who acknowledge African ancestry yet do not sin-
cerely classify themselves as Afro-Brazilian and are only doing so to be
admitted to public universities under the affirmative action program.
Moreover, such a rule would not undermine the prevailing norm that
most Brazilians define themselves as white while recognizing their African
ancestry.
If necessary, Brazilian arbiters could also consider evidence of com-
munity reputation or recognition. However, arbiters should be extremely
cautious in permitting this type of evidence as it has the tendency to be
even more subjective, biased, and unreliable. Often, members of the com-
munity are submitting their personal ideals about how the individual
and/or his or her family comports with their preconceived notions of
what it means to be member of a particular race. Unfortunately, Afro-
Americans in the U.S. and Brazil are similarly stigmatized because of the
physical manifestation of their African ancestry. For example, secondary
teachers in Brazil have been found to put more energy and time in edu-
cating lighter-skinned children "because they believe that [these] children
are more likely to succeed, and thus a good education will be more bene-
ficial to them. ' Brazilian schools frequently use textbooks that depict
Blacks as "lazy, uncivilized, and violent" 263 and Brazilians accept these per-
jorative stereotypes as true and treat non-whites and whites accordingly.2 64
261. Id. at 93-94, 148-49 (explaining that results from the 1991 census show that
parents classify their children in multiple categories; however, when both parents are black
or white a significant majority of children are classified the same color as their parents and
when there is a white mother and a brown father, 55 percent of the children are classified
as white).
262. Id. at 158.
263. Id.
264. According to Telles, 43 percent of respondents in a 1995 survey believed that
negros are only good in music and sports." Id. at 153. He also reports a conversation with
a teacher in Southern Brazil who opines that lighter-brown students "are more disciplined
and study harder" and Black students "can't learn, they are lazy, and they give up right
away. They only want to know about samba and soccer. It's in their blood." Id. at 158.
Naturally, such depreciatory notions associated with darker-skinned individuals and posi-
tive characteristics attributed to individuals with lighter skin color, which are generally
accepted in Brazil and are consciously and unconsciously acted upon in individual interac-
tions, play a defining role in the relative advancement of afrodescendentes and their
lighter-skinned counterparts in social, educational, and employment spheres.
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In addition to what children observe while in school, Brazilians' im-
ages of Blacks and whites are shaped by a media that reifies negative
stereotypes about Blacks and positive stereotypes about whites. "[N]on-
whites on television are often invisible or relegated to menial roles ...
[b]y contrast, white persons and white families are cast as the symbols of
beauty, happiness, and middle-class success., 265 As a result, if those mem-
bers of the community attesting to an individual's Blackness or whiteness
consciously or unconsciously subscribes to these pervasive characteriza-
tions in determining the race of the applicant, their testimony can
perpetuate or even engender new racial stereotypes, which can create
more harm than good. Indeed, the continued proliferation of racial
stereotypes that degrade Blacks and esteem whites simply fortifies the
racial hierarchy that race-conscious affirmative action programs in their
most progressive form seek to dismantle. Thus, only if necessary should
community reputation or recognition evidence be considered, and such
cases should be strictly limited to attestations regarding the race the appli-
cant self-classifies, the race(s) members of the applicant's family have
deemed themselves, or instances where the applicant has been discrimi-
nated against because of his or her race.266
The fourth precept historically used in determining Blackness, "ra-
cial performance," which has been omitted in contemporary cases, should
likewise not be applied in the Brazilian case. This determination method
presumes that whites and Blacks uniquely and inherently exhibit certain
types of behaviors that are mutually exclusive and distinctly identifiable. I
argue that this type of evidence even more than reputation evidence has
the clear potential of perpetuating harmful racial stereotypes and ideology
as well as reinforcing the marginalization that Afro-Brazilians currently
encounter in Brazilian occupational, educational, and socio-economic
spheres.
Despite the divergent conceptualizations of race in the United States
and in Brazil, the salient and important commonality found in both
265. Id. at 155.
266. See also Racusen, supra note 10, at 826-27 for several possible ways Brazilian
arbiters could use when determining whether an individual is an afrodescendente for af-
firmative action purposes in higher education. Racusen's alternatives are a compilation of
racial determination methods employed in India and the United States:
(1)[vlisual examination of the individual by the determining body; (2)
documents that demonstrate an individual's intentions and/or self perception;
(3) the individual's testimony of self-perception, behavior or self-
presentation, or discriminatory experiences; and (4) the testimony of others,
including one's family, neighbors, co-workers, or members of various refer-
ence groups about the individual's self-perception, reputation in the
community, self-presentation and behavior, discriminatory experiences, and
physical appearance.
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countries is that physical appearances trump when it comes to determin-
ing an individual's race and status and how one is viewed and treated in
society. "External definitions of race are especially important because they
often impart power and privilege in social interactions to lighter-skinned
,,267
persons. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of individuals who hold
positions of political, economic, and social power in Brazil as well as those
who are upper and middle level professionals are white.2 68 Results from a
Brazilian National Household Survey taken in 1996 by respondents who
live in the Sio Paulo metropolitan area confirm the racial disparities
within the Brazilian professional class.2 69 The survey revealed that "white
males are two to three times more likely than their non-white counter-
parts of the same lower-class origins to become mid-level professionals
and the relative chances of whites becoming high-level professionals are
even greater."270 The survey also demonstrated that "the large majority of
women who are professionals come from families where their fathers are
also professionals."27 ' As stated earlier, the racial makeup of the Brazilian
professional class is significantly white. Consequently, non-white females
are disproportionately marginalized within unskilled, semi-skilled, and
272
skilled jobs in contrast to their white counterparts.
Based on the survey's findings Edward E.Telles theorizes:
it [is] startlingly clear that race, independent of class, region,
and a money-whitening effect, is a powerful force determining
one's life chances. Moreover, an often forgotten fact is that the
reproduction of racial differences in social mobility from one
generation to the next contributes to increasing racial inequal-
ity over time and not merely maintaining it. In the unlikely
event that racial differences in mobility will suddenly end,
given the extent of Brazil's current racial inequality, it would
still take several generations for Brazil to reach racial equality.27 3
In light of educational statistics, Telles' forecast concerning the dis-
mantling of racial inequality may be accurate. According to one study,
approximately two-thirds of Afro-Brazilian children obtain a basic
267. TELLES, supra note 5 at 218.
268. .K. Sundiata, Late Twentieth Century Patterns of Race Relations in Brazil and the
United States, Phylon 48: 65 (1987)).
269. See TELLES, supra note 5, at 143-44.
270. Id. at 145.
271. Id.
272. Based on the survey results, Telles concludes "for non-white females, a ceiling
effect occurs between unskilled and semiskilled or skilled jobs... While nonwhite males
encounter a glass ceiling that prevents them from entering middle-level professional jobs
and above, nonwhite women seem to be stuck in boots that are glued to the floor of the
occupational structure."Id.
273. Id. at 222.
SPRING 20091
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
education in comparison to 85 percent of white children 274 Once fin
ished with elementary school, a Black child has a 40 percent chance of
attending secondary school whereas a white child has a 57 percent
chance. 27 Additionally, white students who graduate from high school are
almost twice as likely to attend college than their Afro-Brazilians who
276graduate from high school. Thus, not only is the need for increased ac-
cess to secondary education, higher education, and consequentially
professional and political spheres for afrodescendentes genuine, but also
afrodescendentes' unequal access to these institutions on the basis of a physi-
cal appearance signifying pejorative notions presumptively deriving from
their African ancestry, their Blackness, is likewise real.
CONCLUSION
Despite an exaggerated perception that the United States possesses a
clearly defined method of determining who is Black, by employing the
"one-drop" or hypodescent rule, and who is white-the absence of any
Black ancestry-there is no precise and absolute method of determining
race. Race is a social construct that is highly subjective, malleable, rela-
tional, and contextual. However, the massive enslavement and
subordination of those persons who possessed a darker pigmentation, tex-
tured hair, and broader noses, by individuals who in relation to the former
possessed a lighter pigmentation, straighter hair texture, and more narrow
nose, engendered a concept of what is Black and what is white purely
based on physical appearance which transcended geography, demography,
ideology, and time.
Even though the courts and legislatures have expressly adopted nu-
merous methods of determining race based on phenotype, ancestry, and
social recognition unlike in Brazil, 277 in both countries racial constructs
based on physical appearance is the primary mode of determining who is
Black and white. Indeed, historical and contemporary racial determina-
tion cases in the United States demonstrate that courts first determine
274. Nascimento & Nascimento, supra note 9, at 115.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Even though instances of racial determination in Brazil to which I have cited
throughout this Article have not occurred within a formal legal context, members of Bra-
zilian society have determined an individual's race based on his or her physical appearance,
ancestry, and social recognition, as have U.S. courts. Whether these considerations are ap-
plied in a formal legal context or a mundane social context is inconsequential. The
confluence of physical appearance, concepts of ancestry and social recognition has gener-
ated similar constructs of Blackness and whiteness in Brazil and in the United States. As
previously explained, U.S. courts have appropriated these shared constructs of Blackness
and whiteness. Brazilian arbiters can likewise employ the racial determination methods
U.S. courts have appropriated when determining who is Black for purposes of race-
conscious affirmative action in higher education.
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whether an individual's phenotype satisfies the socially prescribed con-
structs of race before any additional inquiry is made. Moreover, Brazil and
the United States share mutual physical constructs of whiteness and
Blackness-which signify the "proportions" of white and/or Black ances-
try an individual possesses-as well as their associated meanings.
Therefore, Brazilian and U.S. arbiters share a common base line when
determining whether an individual is Black and Brazilian arbiters can ap-
propriate standards applied by U.S. courts when deciding the proper
beneficiary of race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher edu-
cation.
One may argue that appropriating the same physical constructs de-
veloped to enslave and oppress people of color should not be used
presently to determine an individual's race. However, we do not yet live in
a world where these physical constructs do not affect an individual's status,
treatment, or opportunity in American society. In both American nations,
it is a stark and unsettling reality that the overwhelming majority of indi-
viduals who are poor, marginalized, undereducated, and underserved
exhibit similar darker skin complexions and facial characteristics-a
physical appearance signifying to society a predominance of African an-
cestry and putative inherent inferiority.
Ideally, using the entrenched constructs of Blackness and whiteness
when determining the proper beneficiary for affirmative action in higher
education will integrate Afro-Brazilians into educational and professional
realms to which they have been systematically and often automatically
denied entry and their lighter-skin counterparts have been provided ac-
cess. Thus, it is my hope that the active presence of Afro-Brazilians in
institutions of higher education, professions, and positions of economic
and political power will ultimately dismantle the pejorative notions
associated with Blackness, the privileging of whiteness, and the stigmati-
zation individuals of visible African descent encounter. Moreover,
Afro-Brazilians' participation in these spheres may induce the abolition of
an enduring racial hierarchy and concomitant system of racial inequal-
ity-present in both Brazil and the United States-whereby Blacks
disproportionately occupy the most disenfranchised positions and whites
the most privileged, and socially mediated signifiers and meanings of
Blackness and whiteness respectively reinforce this status quo.
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